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Jurisdiction 
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3). 
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review 
In 2004, the state engineer rejected Marilyn Hamblin's application to change the 
place of use for her water right. Under Utah law, a state engineer is authorized to reject a 
change application on the following grounds: (i) there is no unappropriated water in the 
proposed source; (ii) the change would not impair existing rights or interfere with the 
more beneficial use of water; (iii) the change is physically or economically infeasible or 
would be detrimental to the public welfare; (iv) the applicant lacks the financial ability to 
take advantage of the change; or (v) the application is not made in good faith or is filed 
for purposes of speculation or monopoly. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3, -8(1) (2004). Here, 
the state engineer rejected Ms. Hamblin's change application on the ground that her water 
right terminated by operation of law in 1985 due to a failure to use the water right, and 
therefore, Ms. Hamblin had no right to the use of water that could be changed. 
In 1996, the Utah Legislature amended section 73-1-4(2) of the forfeiture statute 
to clarify that a judicial decree is required to forfeit water rights due to a lack of water 
use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4(2) (2004). No adjudicative body—judicial or otherwise— 
has declared that Ms. Hamblin's water right terminated by operation of law in 1985 or 
thereafter, and the district court here recognized that the state engineer lacks the authority 
to do so himself. The district court nonetheless ruled that (i) the state engineer did not 
exceed the scope of his authority because he did not "adjudicate" the status of her water 
right by denying the change application; and (ii) the 1996 amendment to section 
73-1-4(2) does not apply retroactively to the forfeiture of water rights prior to 1996 
because the 1996 amendment constituted a substantive change to section 73-1-4. 
Issue 1: Whether a state engineer has authority to reject an application to change 
the place of water use on the sole ground that the state engineer has concluded that the 
water rights at issue have been forfeited, but there has been no prior finding by any 
adjudicative body that the water rights have been forfeited. 
Standard of Review: The court reviews a district court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness. Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, 
If 19, 194P.3d931. 
Issue 2: Whether an amendment that requires a forfeiture of water rights to be 
declared by the judiciary—instead of by some other, or no other, entity—is procedural in 
nature because it merely specifies the machinery of how a legal right is adjudicated 
instead of altering the substance of that legal right. 
Standard of Review: Whether a statute operates retroactively is a question of law 
that this court reviews for correctness. Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Common, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation: These issues were preserved at R. 1001-13; 1157-69. 
Determinative Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1980) (Add. 2); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1985) 
(Add. 1 at R. 1212); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1995) (Add. 3); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 
(1996) (Add. 4); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (2004) (Add. 5); Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 
(2004) (Add. 6); and Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (2004) (Add. 7). 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
Marilyn Hamblin holds title to Water Right 55-11041. (R. 1216.) On August 26, 
2004, Ms. Hamblin filed a permanent change application (a29341) with the state 
engineer, with which she requested approval to change the place of use and point of 
diversion of her water right from Spring Creek/Provo River to the area of Highland City, 
Utah. (R. 1146-54, Add. 8.) On January 30, 2006, the state engineer rejected the change 
application. (R. 777-79, Add. 9.) 
On March 1, 2006, Ms. Hamblin filed a petition for judicial review. (R. 1-26.) 
After the district court ordered the state engineer to issue a new order that "specified] his 
reasons and any statutory basis for approval or rejection/' the state engineer issued a new 
order again rejecting the change application on January 4, 2008. (R. 322; 766-71; R. 
952-58, Add. 10.) The state engineer justified his rejection on the ground that, among 
other things,1 Ms. Hamblin was not a person entitled to the use of water because her 
water right had been forfeited in 1985 due to a lack of beneficial use. (R. 768.) 
The state engineer and Ms. Hamblin stipulated to a set of uncontested facts and 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. 1217.) The state engineer argued that 
Ms. Hamblin's water right no longer existed at the time of her change application 
because it had been forfeited by "operation of law" due to a lack of use. (R. 849-52.) 
Ms. Hamblin responded that her water right had never been subject to any forfeiture 
1
 The "other things" are not at issue on appeal. Either the district court rejected the state 
engineer's other grounds or the district court's agreement with the state engineer was 
based entirely upon the court's ruling that the state engineer could reject the change 
application because "Ms. Hamblin's water right has been forfeited." (R. 1198.) For this 
reason, forfeiture is the only issue relevant on appeal. 
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proceeding, in particular a judicial forfeiture proceeding required under Utah Code 
section 73-1-4(2). (R. 1004-10.) The state engineer does not dispute that under the 2004 
version of the Utah Code, a judicial proceeding would be required, but argued that the 
current statute did not apply retroactively in this case because the factual predicate for 
forfeiture—nonuse for 5 consecutive years—was complete in 1985. (R. 1183-85.) 
On July 13, 2009, the district court granted the state engineer's motion for 
summary judgment and denied Ms. Hamblin's cross-motion. (R. 1194-1217.) The 
district court reasoned that "Ms. Hamblin is not a 'person entitled to the use of water5 
because her water right was forfeited by operation of law in 1985, and, thus, her change 
application cannot be granted." (R. 1206.) The district court's ruling was premised on its 
conclusion that the 1996 amendment to section 73-1-4—which states that a forfeiture of 
water rights may occur only after a judicial determination concerning forfeiture—is 
substantive in nature and does not apply retroactively. (R. 1208-09.) The district court 
further concluded that the state engineer did not "adjudicate" Ms. Hamblin's water right 
in rejecting the change application, even though (i) the rejection was premised upon her 
having forfeited her water right and (ii) no tribunal—judicial or otherwise—has ever 
declared that her right was forfeited. (R. 1210-12.) Ms. Hamblin appeals. (R. 1220.) 
II. Statement of Facts 
The relevant facts are undisputed. Ms. Hamblin is the owner of Water Right No. 
55-11041, as listed in the state engineer's water rights database. (R. 1216.) While that 
water right was not used between January 1, 1980, and January 1, 1985, the right also has 
not been the subject of a forfeiture proceeding, judicial or otherwise. (R. 1215.) These 
are the only facts relevant to review of the summary judgment rulings. 
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Summary of the Argument 
The state engineer lacks the authority to reject a change application based upon his 
own determination that a water right has been forfeited. It is undisputed that a state 
engineer has never had authority under Utah law to adjudicate water rights and declare a 
water right forfeited. The state engineer contends, however, that he did not "adjudicate" 
Ms. Hamblin's water right by rejecting her change application, even though his sole basis 
for rejecting her application was that she was no longer a "person entitled to the use of 
water" under section 73-3-3 because her water right had been forfeited in 1985. 
It is difficult to understand how the state engineer could deny Ms. Hamblin 
something to which she is otherwise entitled on the ground that she forfeited her water 
rights and yet not have "adjudicated" the issue of whether she forfeited her water right. 
A county board of adjustment cannot deny a request for a zoning code variance, which 
the board otherwise has no grounds to deny, on the sole basis that an adjoining landowner 
could succeed in a boundary by acquiescence were the adjoining owner to file a judicial 
action to quiet title. The result is no different when the state engineer is asked to vary the 
point of diversion for a water right. The bases on which the state engineer can deny a 
change application are enumerated, and that enumeration does not include the state 
engineer determining that the factual predicate for forfeiture exists. The district court 
should have rejected the state engineer's semantic argument concerning the meaning of 
"adjudicate." 
In addition, since 1996, section 73-1-4(2) has specified that forfeiture of a water 
right requires "judicial action." The state engineer does not dispute that if a post-1996 
version of section 73-1-4 applied here, then the state engineer lacked authority to reject 
the change application. (R. 1183-85.) The district court refused to apply the 1996 
amendment by construing the "judicial action" requirement as substantive in nature and, 
therefore, applicable only prospectively. The district court erred in three ways. 
First, retroactive application is beside the point because Ms. Hamblin filed her 
change application in 2004, well after the 1996 amendment. This case does not involve a 
change application submitted prior to the 1996 amendment where the applicant now asks 
the court to apply the later enacted statute to review the state engineer's rejection of the 
application. Second, the 1996 amendment is procedural in nature, as it merely specifies 
that the legal machinery required for forfeiture is a judicial proceeding. Procedural 
changes to statutes apply retroactively under Utah law. Finally, even if a specification of 
which entity adjudicates a forfeiture proceeding were otherwise substantive in nature, the 
1996 amendment merely clarified an ambiguity in the prior statute by making express the 
requirement that forfeiture is effective only through judicial action. Clarifications of law 
also apply retroactively. 
For all of these reasons, the district court erred in failing to apply the 1996 
amendment to section 73-1-4. Application of the 1996 amendment would mean that the 
state engineer's rejection of the change application was improper. This court should 
reverse the district court's summary judgment rulings and remand with instructions to 
enter summary judgment in favor of Ms. Hamblin. 
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Argument 
I. The State Engineer Lacks Authority to Declare Water Rights Forfeited 
The state engineer had no authority to reject Ms. Hamblin's change application on 
the ground that she forfeited her water right in 1985. Under Utah law, "[t]he state 
engineer is an executive, not a judicial officer, and does not have authority to adjudicate 
the rights of water users." Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, If 40, 98 P.3d l.2 
Consistent with this, past state engineers have recognized that they lack authority 
to determine whether the forfeiture of a water right has rendered a change application 
inappropriate. For example, the state engineer has rejected applications to appropriate 
additional water where the application was premised upon the forfeiture of other water 
rights because, the state engineer explained, clhe question as to whether water once 
appropriated had reverted to the public [by] nonuse or abandonment required legal 
determinations which are generally beyond the jurisdiction of his office." Shields v. Dry 
Creek Irrigation Co., 12 Utah 2d 98, 100, 363 P.2d 82, 83 (1961) (emphasis added); see 
also Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ^  3, 82 P.3d 
1125 (state engineer wwdid not decide the question of forfeiture, noting and apparently 
agreeing with the [applicant's] position that a finding of forfeiture requires judicial action 
and therefore was beyond the state engineer's jurisdiction.''') (emphasis added). 
2
 Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 450, 154 P.2d 748 (1944) (in considering 
change applications, state engineer uacts in an administrative capacity only and has no 
authority to determine rights of parties"); United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland 
Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, U 14, 79 P.3d 945 Cw[A]s a general rule, the determination of 
the priority of rights is a judicial function and not among the powers of the state 
engineer."). 
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Not only does the state engineer lack authority to determine that a water right has 
been forfeited in reviewing a change application, courts lack authority to make that 
determination when reviewing the state engineer's rejection of a change application. 
Under Utah law, a "court may not determine issues not within the power of the engineer 
to determine." United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 8, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951). As 
this court has explained, *'[i]n the case of an application to appropriate or to change the 
place of diversion or use, [the state engineer] merely approves or rejects the application 
without determining the priorities of the parties, although often the facts recorded or 
shown by the engineer's records may be conclusive as to the priorities of the rights of the 
parties." IdL at 8-9. In other words, even if the facts concerning priority are clear, the 
state engineer, and then the district court on review, lacks authority to reject a change 
application in a manner that adjudicates the water rights of the applicant. 
The state engineer attempts to avoid these straightforward principles by asserting 
that he did not "adjudicate" Ms. Hamblin's water right when he rejected her change 
application because facts supporting forfeiture—5 years of nonuse—were undisputed. 
(R. 850-52.) While undisputed facts may indicate that no facts require adjudication, 
undisputed facts do not indicate that legal issues based upon those facts do not require 
adjudication. Otherwise, summary judgment would never adjudicate the merits of a 
claim because no facts are "adjudicated." For that reason, whether the facts supporting 
the forfeiture are undisputed is irrelevant to whether the state engineer "adjudicates" a 
forfeiture issue in rejecting a change application on the ground that the water rights have 
been forfeited. Undisputed facts concerning nonuse are beside the point. 
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The more serious argument does not turn on whether facts are undisputed, but 
instead relies upon this court's implicit approval of a state engineer rejecting a change 
application on the ground that the water right had been forfeited by operation of law. 
Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673 (Utah 1989). In Nephi City, this court rejected 
Nephi City's argument that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
municipalities. Nephi City advanced this argument after the state engineer rejected its 
change application on the ground that its "water rights were forfeited for nonuse by 
operation of law." Id. at 675. Importantly, Nephi City did not argue, as Ms. Hamblin 
does here, that the state engineer lacked the authority to adjudicate the issue of forfeiture 
in reviewing a change application, but instead relied only upon its specific constitutional 
challenge to the forfeiture statute itself. In other words, Nephi City involved whether the 
Utah State Constitution requires the exemption of municipalities from the forfeiture 
statute, not whether the state engineer has the authority to reject a change application 
based upon his own determination that the forfeiture statute could be satisfied, something 
that was neither briefed nor decided in Nephi City.3 
In fact, because the state engineer's acts are purely ministerial, he lacks authority 
to reject a change application for a reason other than those specifically enumerated in the 
statutes governing his review of change applications: (i) there is no unappropriated water 
J
 Nephi City's brief confirms that the issue was not presented to the court. 
The issue raised by this appeal is whether the State Engineer may 
constitutionally declare a municipal corporation's water right forfeited for 
non-use pursuant to section 73-1-4 U.C.A. 1953 as amended given the 
provisions of Article XI Section 6 of the Utah Constitution which in 
essence states that a municipality within the State of Utah may not transfer 
or dispose of its water rights except in exchange for a water right or water 
supply of equal value. 
Opening Brief, Nephi City v. Hansen, Utah Supreme Court No. 860614 (Add. 11) at 2. 
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in the proposed source; (ii) the change would not impair existing rights or interfere with 
the more beneficial use of water; (iii) the change is physically or economically infeasible 
or would be detrimental to the public welfare; (iv) the applicant lacks the financial ability 
to take advantage of the change; or (v) the application is not made in good faith or is filed 
for purposes of speculation or monopoly.4 Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3, -8(1) (2004). 
Establishment of the factual predicate for forfeiture under a different statute, section 73-
1-4, is conspicuously absent from that list, something previous state engineers have 
recognized. Shields v. Dry Creek Irrigation Co., 12 Utah 2d 98, 100, 363 P.2d 82 (1961) 
(state engineer "ruled that the question as to whether water once appropriated had 
reverted to the public [by] nonuse or abandonment required legal determinations which 
are generally beyond the jurisdiction of his office").5 
Nor does the state engineer gain that authority because a person submitting a 
change application must be "a person entitled to the use of water" under section 73-3-3. 
This language permits the state engineer to reject the application of a person who has no 
documented water right at all, but it does not permit the state engineer to disregard a 
documented water right based upon the state engineer's own application of the forfeiture 
statute. An example from real property law illustrates the importance of this distinction. 
4
 While the state engineer argued that rejection was also appropriate due to impairment 
and a lack of unappropriated water in the proposed source, the district court "reliefd] on 
its . . . forfeiture analysis" in addressing those arguments. The district court reasoned that 
Ms. Hamblin could not demonstrate that there was unappropriated water at the new 
proposed source because her right had been forfeited. (R. 1200, Add. 1.) 
5
 It is true, however, that if Ms. Hamblin had failed to challenge the state engineer's 
rejection of her change application directly, and later challenged that rejection collaterally 
in a case in which it was determined that Ms. Hamblin, in fact, had forfeited her water 
rights, then the state engineer's rejection of the change application would not be reversed. 
Baugh v. Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361,362, 431 P.2d 790 (1967). 
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While a person must own real property to request and obtain a variance in the zoning 
code for that property, a county board of adjustment cannot deny a request for variance 
on the sole ground that an adjoining landowner could establish the elements of boundary 
by acquiescence if the adjoining landowner only initiated a quiet title action. For the 
board of adjustment to deny the request on that basis would be for it to "adjudicate" the 
boundary by acquiescence claim, something it cannot do. 
Similarly here, the state engineer must "adjudicate" the forfeiture issue to reject 
the change application because the water right has been forfeited.6 Yet the state engineer 
lacks authority to adjudicate a water right, especially while considering a change 
application. Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ^ f 16, 
82 P.3d 1125 ("We doubt that the legislature intended the change application process to 
carry with it an increased risk of losing the rights underlying the application."). 
This court should reject the state engineer's semantic argument concerning the 
term "adjudicate" and reverse the district court's summary judgment rulings. Even if 
Ms. Hamblin had submitted her change application before the 1996 amendment, the state 
engineer lacked authority to reject Ms. Hamblin's change application on the sole ground 
that the factual predicate for establishing forfeiture existed in 1985. 
6
 The procedures governing forfeiture of a water right must be strictly observed in favor 
of the owner and against the government. Massey v. Griffiths, 2005 UT App 410, f^ 8, 
131 P.3d 243 (because of harsh effects of tax forfeiture, statutes setting forth antecedents 
to forfeiting real property are to be construed strictly in favor of owner and against 
government); see also In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the 
"forfeiture of [property] rights is disfavored"); Schuller v. D'Angelo, 458 N.Y.S.2d 501, 
502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (wcthe law looks with disfavor on automatic forfeitures of 
rights"); Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 70 P.3d 669, 674 (Idaho 2003) 
("This Court has held . . . that abandonments and forfeitures are not favored.")-
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II. Ms. Hamblin Is a Person Entitled to the Use of Water Because Her Water 
Right Was Never Subject to a Judicial Action for Forfeiture 
While the fact that the state engineer improperly "adjudicated" Ms. Hamblin's 
water right is dispositive, this court need not reach the issue to reverse the district court's 
summary judgment rulings. It is undisputed that if the 1996 amendment to section 
73-1-4—which clarified that a forfeiture can be effective only through "judicial action"— 
applies to the state engineer's forfeiture determination here, then the state engineer lacked 
authority to reject Ms. Hamblin's change application. The state engineer, and the district 
court, reasoned that the 1996 amendment does not apply because the amendment is 
substantive in nature, and, therefore, cannot apply retroactively to the nonuse of 
Ms. Hamblin's water right between 1980 and 1985. 
As demonstrated below, the 1996 amendment applies to the state engineer's 
forfeiture determination for three reasons. First, Ms. Hamblin filed her change 
application in 2004, well after the 1996 amendment. Second, the 1996 amendment is 
procedural in nature, as it merely specifies the legal machinery required for forfeiture—a 
judicial proceeding. Procedural changes to statutes apply retroactively under Utah law. 
Finally, the 1996 amendment merely clarified an ambiguity in the prior statute by making 
express the requirement that forfeiture is effective only through a judicial proceeding. 
Clarifying amendments also apply retroactively. 
Below, Ms. Hamblin will discuss each of these issues, after outlining the relevant 
statutory language and the district court's interpretation of that language. 
A. The 1996 Amendment to Section 73-1-4 and the District Court's Ruling 
Section 73-1-4 addresses statutory forfeiture of water rights. It provides that a 
person may forfeit a water right that is unused for a specified period. The state engineer, 
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and the district court, relied upon the 1985 version of the forfeiture statute, which stated: 
"When an appropriator or his successor in interest shall abandon or cease to use water for 
a period of five years the right shall cease and thereupon such water shall revert to the 
public . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1985). The district court interpreted this 
language to be self-executing and thereby authorizing the state engineer to recognize 
forfeiture by "operation of law" without adjudicating the water right at issue. (R. 1212.) 
As discussed above, the state engineer previously has rejected the notion that this 
language is self-executing and thereby authorizes him to recognize forfeiture by 
"operation of law" in considering a change application. Shields v. Dry Creek Irrigation 
Co., 12 Utah 2d 98, 100, 363 P.2d 82 (1961) (state engineer "ruled that the question as to 
whether water once appropriated had reverted to the public nonuse or abandonment 
required legal determinations which are generally beyond the jurisdiction of his office"). 
In 1996, section 73-1-4 was amended to clarify that a judicial action is the 
required mechanism to declare forfeiture, something left unclear in the 1985 version. 
After the 1996 amendment, "[a] water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial action 
to declare the right forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest 
period of nonuse of at least five years." Utah Code Ann. § 73-l-4(2)(b)(i) (1996) 
(emphasis added). If the 1996 amendment governs the state engineer's consideration of 
Ms. Hamblin's change application, then the state engineer's forfeiture determination was 
an improper basis to reject the application because no judicial action has declared 
Ms. Hamblin's rights to be forfeited. (R. 1209.) 
7
 Further clarifying the need for judicial action, in 2008 section 73-l-4(2)(a) was 
amended to state that the period of nonuse only makes the water right "subject to 
forfeiture in accordance with Subsection 2(c)." 
n 
The district court ruled that the 1996 amendment was substantive in nature 
because "the legal machinery at work under the former version of the statute was 
operation of law, and the 1996 amendment changed the legal machinery to judicial 
action." (R. 1209.) In making this ruling, the district court apparently misread this 
court's case law. This court has made clear that a change is procedural if it pertains to 
the "legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective." 
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12,1J14, 650 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (quoting Brown & 
Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Common, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997)). 
The district court's other ground for ruling that the 1996 amendment was 
substantive is that application of the 1996 amendment would change the outcome of this 
case. (R. 1207-08.) Of course, any procedural change has the potential to change the 
outcome of a case—otherwise parties would rarely bother to litigate procedural issues. 
The fact that procedural changes can be outcome determinative does not thereby 
transform those changes into substantive changes for purposes of a retroactivity analysis. 
Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, If 39, 104 P.3d 1185 (change to notice 
of claim procedures, although dispositive of plaintiff s claim, nonetheless was procedural 
in nature and applied retroactively). 
Therefore, the district court's reasoning is at odds with this court's case law. And 
as demonstrated below, the district court erred in refusing to apply the 1996 amendment. 
B. The 1996 Amendment Applies to the State Engineer's Forfeiture 
Determination Because Ms. Hamblin Submitted Her Change 
Application in 2004 
The 1996 amendment governs because they had become effective nearly a decade 
before Ms. Hamblin submitted her change application on August 26, 2004. Under Utah 
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law, lawsuits are governed by the version of the statute in effect "at the time of the events 
giving rise to the suit." Harvey, 2010 UT 12 at *f 12. Here, because it is undisputed that 
this case involves the appropriateness of a rejection of a change application, not a 
forfeiture proceeding, the events giving rise to the suit are events in 2004, when Ms. 
Hamblin submitted her change application. For this reason, the state engineer should 
have applied the 2004 version of section 73-1-4, not the 1985 version of the forfeiture 
statute. Retroactivity is beside the point. This court should reverse. 
C. The 1996 Amendment Applies Retroactively Because It Is Procedural 
The district court's determination that the 1996 amendment did not operate 
retroactively is contrary to Utah law. Under Utah law, legislative enactments operate 
retroactively where they are procedural in nature. Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997). Procedural changes are 
those "that do not 'enlarge, eliminate, or destroy' substantive rights [and] can be applied 
retroactively." B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, ^ 20, 128 P.3d 
1161; see also In re Kaul 4 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Kan. 2000) ("Procedural laws are those that 
concern the manner and order of conducting suits or the mode of proceeding to enforce 
legal rights"). 
Here, the 1996 amendment was procedural in nature for a number of reasons. 
First, it merely specified who must declare a forfeiture—the judiciary. A few cases 
illustrate the procedural nature of the amendment. In B.A.M. Development this court 
determined that a statutory change that permitted district courts to call witnesses and take 
evidence when reviewing county land use decisions was procedural in nature because it 
did not "enlarge, eliminate or destroy substantive rights." 2006 UT 2 at j[ 21. Rather, the 
is 
change was procedural because it "endeavors to improve the quality and integrity of 
judicial review of land-use decisions. It is a statute aimed at discovering, evaluating, and 
preserving substantive rights by improving judicial procedures." IcL For similar reasons, 
a statutory amendment that changed who performs evaluations of mentally challenged 
offenders is procedural. State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Second, the 1996 amendment did not "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy" 
Ms. Hamblin's substantive right. B.A.M. Development 2006 UT 2 at Tj 20. Were the 
state engineer to bring a forfeiture action—something the engineer concedes he could 
do—the fact that a judicial officer must preside would not change the substantive law 
applied in that proceeding. (R. 1183.) The district court reasoned that the 1996 
amendment was a substantive change because the outcome of the summary judgment 
motion before the district court hinged upon whether the 1996 amendment applies. (R. 
1208-09.) What is significant, however, is whether the substantive law in forfeiture 
proceedings would be different, not whether the outcome of the motion before the district 
court is affected by the change. If the district court's test were the correct one, then all 
procedural changes would be substantive because, presumably, the only reason parties 
would raise the issue is that it is dispositive of some motion or claim.8 The issue is 
whether the substantive law governing forfeiture proceedings changes, and it did not, as 5 
Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
306, 325 (1986) ("Ultimately, procedure and substance cannot be divorced: no procedural 
decision can be completely 'neutral' in the sense that it does not affect substance.") 
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years of nonuse was sufficient in 1985, was sufficient in 1996, and was sufficient in 
2004.9 Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1985, 1996, 2004). 
Indeed, the district court's reasoning cuts against numerous examples of statutory 
changes that apply retroactively despite having a dispositive impact on the litigation. For 
instance, standard of review, which can certainly affect outcome, is procedural. Due 
South, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 2008 UT 71, If 14, 197 P.3d 82 
(cThe standard of review is a matter of procedural, rather than substantive, law."); Evans 
& Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 437-38 (Utah 
1997) (change to de novo review of Utah State Tax Commission is procedural). 
Changing who must receive a notice of claim, while outcome determinative of a 
motion for summary judgment and subsequent appeal, also does not transform that 
change from procedural to substantive. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 
80, ffif 39-40, 104 P.3d 1185. In Goebel this court explained that where the statutory 
change "merely changed the identity of the party receiving the notice of claim from the 
City's "governing body' to the city recorder. It would be difficult to conceive of a 
statutory change that would do less to 'enlarge, eliminate, or destroy' a plaintiffs 
substantive rights." Id at Tj 40. 
9
 The 1996 amendment requires that a judicial action be commenced within 15 years of 
nonuse, but this provision is not outcome determinative here because there has been no 
judicial action commenced at any time to determine whether Ms. Hamblin has forfeited 
her water right. 
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In addition, changes in statutes of limitations can be outcome determinative, but 
they are nonetheless procedural.10 Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, ^  26, 193 
P.3d 86 ("Statutes of limitations are essentially procedural in nature and . . . do not 
abolish a substantive right to sue."); State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ^  28, 37 P.3d 1103. In 
Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, this court retroactively applied an extension of the statute of 
limitations from six years to eight years. 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978). The fact that 
the retroactive application changes the outcome of a case does not compel the conclusion 
that the statute of limitations was substantive. Id.; see also State v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 
52,1fl2,975P.2d939.H 
The same is true here. Merely clarifying that judicial action is required to perfect 
a forfeiture claim and divest someone of vested rights similarly does not "enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy" any substantive rights. Therefore, the 1996 amendment was 
procedural in nature. 
Third, the legislative history of the 1996 amendment confirms its procedural 
nature. State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, ^  11, 144 P.3d 1152 ("The evolution of a statute 
A change to a statute of limitations may be applied retroactively if the change was 
made before the limitations period for the original statute had run because "after a cause 
of action has become barred by the statute of limitations the defendant has a vested right 
to rely on that statute as a defense." Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Utah 
1995). This exception does not apply here, however, because the expiration of the period 
of nonuse does not create a vested right in the state engineer. SUTHERLAND STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 41.6 (6th ed. 2009) Ow'[V]ested right' means simply 
a right which under particular circumstances is protected from legislative interference."). 
11
 This court has expressed a similar principle in cases involving "ex post facto" 
challenges: wCA statutory amendment does not violate the ex post facto clause merely 
because it works to the detriment of the accused." State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 587 
(Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424-28 (Utah 
1986); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) ("Even though it may work to 
the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto."). 
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through amendment by our Legislature may also shed light on a statute's intended 
meaning."). The sponsor of the 1996 amendment, Representative David Ure, stated that 
the amendment contained a procedural change intended to operate retroactively: 6wWhat 
we did was finally establish a way that water might be forfeited after it's had a five years 
nonuse in the State of Utah. We did nothing to change that part of the code. We only 
established a way that the foreclosure might come close - might finally be complete." 
(Transcript of January 29, 1996 House Floor Debate on H.B. 69, R. 967, Add. 12.) In 
response to (then) Representative Valentine's question concerning the purpose of the 
1996 amendment, the sponsor stated that "it's to make a way to finally bring it to court -
see there is no process in place for which the forfeiture finally came closed and this is the 
reason for it." (R. 966 (emphasis added).) 
Representative Brown then confirmed the procedural nature of the change: "So, 
what we're trying to do is put a process in place that protects people, not gives them more 
exposure. Whether it's individual water owners or municipalities." (R. 963 (emphasis 
added).) Instead, under the proposed bill, "the challenge of water rights must be brought 
about in court action. In other words, if no one says anything about your nonuse, then it 
is still your water right. But if someone decides that you haven't utilized that water right 
and wants to challenge it, they can do it through court." (Id.) 
The legislative history confirms that the legislature intended the new procedure in 
the 1996 amendment to govern all 5-year gaps in water use. As this court has 
The district court discounted the legislative history, at least in part, due to the fact that 
at the end of the floor debate containing the quotations given, the bill was circled. 
(R. 1208 n.2) However, the bill was un-circled the following day. (See Excerpt from 
Transcript of January 30, 1996 House Floor Debate, Add. 13.) 
1Q 
recognized, "[t]he intent to have a statute operate retroactively may be indicated by 
explicit statements that the statute should be applied retroactively or by clear and 
unavoidable implication that the statute operates on events already past." Evans & 
Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Common, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997). 
Here, the statements of the sponsors reveal that the 1996 amendment applies to "events 
already past," as does its language designed to bring clarity to water rights. 
Fourth, principles of "convenience, reasonableness, and justice" confirm that the 
1996 amendment was procedural in nature. This court considers factors such as 
"[convenience, reasonableness, and justice . . . in deciding whether a statute has a merely 
remedial or procedural purpose." Goebel, 2004 UT 80 at ^ 39. Here, retroactive 
application will promote both convenience and reasonable certainty for water rights 
holders. In re General Determination of Rights to the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, ^  41, 
110 P.3d 666 (recognizing 'laudable goal of certainty"). 
The legislative purpose in enacting the 1996 amendment was to provide clarity to 
holders of water rights where there may exist a 5-year gap in use since 1896. If the 1996 
amendment did not operate retroactively to require a judicial determination in all cases, 
then the 1996 amendment solved nothing until at least 2001, after 5 years of nonuse post-
enactment; or perhaps until 2011, after 15 years of the failure to bring a judicial 
proceeding post-enactment. Not only would prospective application not further the 
legislative purpose of bringing clarity to water rights, but it would affirmatively 
undermine that purpose, by creating more confusion. 
For the same reason, the district court's interpretation would create greater 
uncertainty in the review of change applications. For example, it is unclear under the 
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district court's ruling whether the state engineer can recognize forfeiture only if the 5 
years completed before enactment of the 1996 amendment or whether it is enough that 
the 5 years began prior to enactment. Such uncertainty would hinder the goal of 
achieving the highest and best possible use of the water. Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 
2006 UT 16, Tf 36, 133 P.3d 382 (change applications can further "policy of putting water 
to the best use possible"); Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1969) 
(stating that the rights of persons entitled to the use of water to file a change application 
uis intended as an affirmative grant of the right to change the diversion in order to put 
water to the best possible use"). 
As a result, principles of reasonableness, convenience, and justice also weigh in 
support of a retroactive application. Retroactive application allows all water rights 
owners to rely with certainty upon the current statute. There would be no confusion as to 
which rights already have been forfeited by operation of law. No user would need to face 
the inconvenience and cost of having to retain legal counsel to determine whether the 15-
year limitation on bringing forfeiture actions actually applies to them. They could file a 
change application without fearing the risk of "non-judicial" forfeiture. For all of these 
reasons, this court should hold that the 1996 amendment is procedural in nature and apply 
retroactively. 
D. The 1996 Amendment Merely Clarified Existing Law 
The 1996 amendment also applies retroactively because it merely clarified existing 
law. Under Utah law, a statutory change is retroactive when its purpose wcis to clarify the 
meaning of an earlier enactment or is merely an amplification as to how the law should 
have been understood prior to its enactment." Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459,461-62 (Utah 1989) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted); see also Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, f 59, 37 P. 3d 
1130. 
Prior to the 1996 amendment, section 73-1-4 was silent as to the procedure for 
declaring forfeiture. It read, "When an appropriated or his successor in interest shall 
abandon or cease to use water for a period of five years the right shall cease and 
thereupon such water shall revert to the public . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1985). 
The 1996 amendment clarified that "[a] water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial 
action to declare the right forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the 
latest period of nonuse of at least five years." Utah Code Ann. § 73-l-4(2)(b)(i) (1996) 
(emphasis added). 
The legislative sponsor recognized the unclarity in then-section 73-1-4, stating that 
the amendment "only established a way that the foreclosure might come close - might 
finally be complete." (R. 967.) Prior to the amendment, there was "no process in place 
for which the forfeiture finally came closed." (Id.) Under the 1996 amendment, the 
rights of those holding and those challenging water rights would be clear: "In other 
words, if no one says anything about your non-use, then it is still your water right. But if 
someone decides that you haven't utilized that water right and wants to challenge it, they 
can do it through court." Id. Therefore, the purpose of the 1996 amendment was to 
clarify, not to change, the law. For this additional reason, this court should reverse the 
district court's summary judgment rulings. 
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Conclusion 
This court should reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the state engineer. First, the state engineer has never had authority to adjudicate 
the forfeiture of water rights in considering a change application, something he did here. 
Second, the 1996 amendment to section 73-1-4 clarified that judicial action is required 
for forfeiture, a change that was not only procedural but also clarifying, both of which 
warrant retroactive application of the statute. For all of these reasons, the state engineer 
lacked authority to reject Ms. Hamblin's change application, and the district court erred 
in its summary judgment rulings. This court should reverse the district court's summary 
judgment rulings and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of 
Ms. Hamblin. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2010. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 060400639 
DATE: 13 July 2009 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 3 
This matter is before the court for ruling on the State Engineer's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the plaintiffs Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The parties came 
before the court for oral argument on May 12, 2009. Having read the parties' pleadings and 
considered the oral arguments, the court now rules in this matter. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Marilyn Hamblin ("Ms. Hamblin" or "the plaintiff) filed her Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on January 20, 2009. 
2. The parties filed their Joint Stipulation of Uncontested Facts on January 20, 2009. 
3. The State Engineer filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on January 21, 2009. 
4. The plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition to State Engineer's Cross-Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on February 19, 2009. 
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5. The State Engineer filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on February 23, 2009. 
6. The plaintiff filed her Reply to State Engineer's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 16, 2009. 
7. The State Engineer filed his Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment on March 18, 2009. 
8. The parties came before the court for oral argument on both motions on May 12, 
2009. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS1 
1. The Provo River Decree, signed by Judge Morse on May 2, 1921, divides the Provo 
River system (including tributaries) geographically into two divisions, the Provo Division (lower 
river) and the Wasatch Division (upper river). 
2. Each beneficial use in the Provo River Decree was assigned a water right number 
and given a file by the State Engineer to better administer and distribute the water rights, as well 
as to track ownership changes. 
3. A.L. Tanner's 30 acres of beneficial use from Spring Creek and the Provo River, 
found on Page 19 of the Provo River Decree, was assigned Water Right No. 55-11041 (the 
"Water Right") by the Utah Division of Water Rights (water right 11041 in area 55). The file for 
lrThe facts from the parties' Joint Stipulation of Uncontested Facts are found in numbers 
3, 4, and 6. The fourth stipulated fact is not listed because the court found it immaterial to its 
decision, and because the court found it ambiguous. The other facts were not disputed in the 
parties' briefing on their respective motions. 
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Water Right No. 55-11041 is located at the State Engineer's office. 
4. The Water Right has not been put to beneficial use since January 1,1980. 
5. In 1995 Utah Valley, which includes the area surrounding the Water Right, was 
closed to all new appropriations of water and was considered fully appropriated. 
6. Spring Creek, a point of diversion for the Water Right, flowed continuously with 
enough water to satisfy all rights until January 1, 2002 and has been completely dry since that 
date. 
7. On August 26, 2004 Ms. Hamblin submitted a change application for the unused 
Water Right. The application requested a change of the point of diversion for 120 acre-feet of 
water from the Spring Creek/Provo River to within the water system of Highland City, Utah. 
8. On January 30,2006 the State Engineer issued an order rejecting the Change 
Application. 
9. Subsequently, Ms. Hamblin filed this action. As a result of previous motions in this 
action, the State Engineer issued a new order on January 4, 2008, containing more specificity 
about the justification for the rejection of the Change Application. 
10. The Water Right has never been the subject of a judicial proceeding for forfeiture. 
DISCUSSION 
In his motion for Summary Judgment, the State Engineer asserts that the Change 
Application was properly denied because (1) the Water Right has been forfeited by operation of 
law, and (2) other water users' rights would be impaired if the Change Application were granted. 
In her motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Ms. Hamblin asks the court to find (1) that she is a 
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person entitled to file the Change Application for the Water Right, and (2) that her Change 
Application complied with the statutory requirements for filing a permanent change application, 
as found in Utah Code Ann. 73-3-3. ("U.C.A.") The court will address each of the parties7 
arguments in turn. 
I. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, any alleged 
issue of fact must be material. See Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (citing 
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982); Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 
619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980)). Furthermore, 
[a] major purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial 
by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder. In accordance 
with this purpose, specific facts are required to show whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial. The allegations of a pleading or factual 
conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
fact. 
Overstockcom, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, ^ | 12, 192 P.3d 858 (quoting Reagan 
Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984)). 
This court has authority to "review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting 
from informal agency actions." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402 (2009). "[R]eview by trial de novo 
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means a new trial with no deference to the administrative proceedings below." Archer v. Bd. of 
State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995). 
[A] district court, when reviewing the state engineer's decision to approve or 
reject an application, is not sitting in its capacity as an adjudicator of rights, but 
is merely charged with ensuring that the state engineer correctly performed an 
administrative task. . . . [W]hen conducting a de novo review of the state 
engineer's approval or rejection of an application, the court simply 'determines 
whether the application should be approved or rejected and does not fix the 
rights of the parties beyond the determination of that matter.'" 
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co,, 2006 UT 16, ^ 35, 133 P.3d 382 (quoting Eardley v. Terry, 11 
P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1938)). 
As the Utah Supreme Court recently noted, the term "de novo" is often used 
imprecisely. Beller v. Rolfe, 2008 UT 68, U 9, 194 P.3d 949. "Trial de novo can refer to either a 
complete retrial upon new evidence or a trial upon the record made by a lower tribunal. The 
proper meaning largely depends on the context in which it is used." Id. In the context of 
reviewing decisions by the State Engineer, the court finds that the former meaning is appropriate. 
In the cases discussed in Searle, the district courts received fresh evidence in their respective 
trials, and they were apparently not bound to simply reviewing the record established before the 
state engineer. See 2006 UT 16 at U 8. 
Thus, this court rejects Ms. Hamblin's contention that the only issues before the court 
are the three grounds the State Engineer provided for rejecting the Change Application. Rather, 
the issue before the court is "whether the application should be approved or rejected." And, 
currently, the only issues before the court are those set forth in the parties' respective motions for 
summary judgment, which the court will decide based on the undisputed facts set forth above. 
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II. Forfeiture 
In sum, the State Engineer argues that Ms. Hamblin lost the Water Right by forfeiture 
under applicable statutes in effect in 1985. Ms. Hamblin argues that the current amended version 
of the statute should apply, which would require a judicial proceeding before her right could be 
considered forfeited. 
During the years pertinent to the facts of this case, 1980 to 1985, the forfeiture statute 
in the Utah Code read as follows: 
When an appropriator or his successor in interest shall abandon or cease to use 
water for a period of five years the right shall cease and thereupon such water 
shall revert to the public, and may be again appropriated as provided in this 
title, unless before the expiration of such five-year period the appropriator or 
his successor in interest shall have filed with the state engineer a verified 
application for extension of time, not to exceed five years, within which to 
resume the use of such water The provisions of this section are applicable 
whether such unused or abandoned water is used by others without right. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1985). The State Engineer reads this statute in conjunction with 
U.C.A. 73-3-3, which, in 1980, said the following: "Any person entitled to the use of water may 
change the place of diversion or use and may use the water for other purposes than those for 
which it was originally appropriated, but no such change shall be made if it impairs any vested 
rights without just compensation." Thus, the State Engineer argues, Ms. Hamblin's Change 
Application was appropriately denied because by 2004, when she filed her change application, 
she was not a person "entitled to the use of water" because her right was forfeited by operation of 
law in 1985. 
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In support of this analysis, the Seite cngincei ICIICS on Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 
673 (I Iiiih 1989), which interprets the 1980 version of U.C. A. 73-1-4, which wus suhsi ;nii ively 
the same version in plaee m 1 l)SS hi Nt'plu City, the State Engineer rejected Nephi City's 
applications to change the points of diversion of four claimed wittei i ights on the basis that the 
water v\>\^lunt . Forfeited. 779 P.2d at 673. Specifically, the State Engineer found that 
"[bjecause there were no subsisting mits, there could be no change in their points of 
diversion " Id. On summary judgment, the trial court upheld the State Engineer's decisioi 
the Utah Supreme Court affiT * lecision, finding that "[tjhere [was] little question that 
section 73-1-4 works a forfeiture of Nephi City's four noncoi-. u-i-r11 v\ >: rights. These rights 
were unused for r ^ y years." Id. at 674—75. The court further noted that Nephi City failed 
to request an extension of time, and thus, concluded ihat tcunder the plain terms of section 73-1-4, 
Nephi City's water rights were forfeited for nonuse by operation of law." 
Ms. Hamblin argues thai her right has never been forfeited because the legislature has 
rejected the procedures proposed by the State Engineer and has implei nented clai ified procedures 
by amending U.C.A. 73-1-4. The pertinent portions of the 2008 version of that section are as 
follows: 
(2)(a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases 
to use all or a portion of a water right for a period of seven years, the water right or the 
unused portion of that water right is subject to forfeiture in accordance with Subsection 
(2)(c), unless the appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest files a nonuse 
application with the state engineer 
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(2)(c)(i) A water right or a portion of the water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial 
action to declare the right forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the 
latest period of nonuse of at least seven years. 
The judicial forfeiture language was first added with the 1996 amendment. The 2008 
amendment removed the words "ceases and the water reverts to the public" from the most recent 
version of the statute to that point and replaced them with "subject to forfeiture in accordance 
with Subsection 2(c)." Thus, under the current version of U.C.A. 73-1-4, Ms. Hamblin argues 
that the Water Right has not been forfeited because no judicial action has ever occurred. The 
case law the State Engineer relies upon is also inapplicable, she argues, because it is based on the 
former version of the statute. 
The question before the court is which version of the forfeiture statute should apply to 
Ms. Hamblin's Water Right. Neither party has been able to direct the court to any cases applying 
the current forfeiture statute in situations similar to the one in this case. Thus, the question of 
how the current amended version of the forfeiture statute should be applied to questions of 
forfeiture periods completed before the 1996 amendments appears to be one of first impression. 
In support of applying the former version of the statute, the State Engineer argues that 
the amendments made substantive changes and cannot be applied retroactively because the 
legislature did not make the new language retroactive. U.C.A. 68-3-3 states: "No part of these 
revised statutes is retroactive unless expressly so declared." The amendments in U.C.A. 73-1-4 
contain no language allowing retroactive application. 
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.. Ms. HamWiij ronnlu s thai flu legislature was not required to include specific language 
about retroactivity because the changes were procedural in nature, i u>! substantive Specifically, 
she argues thai "the rule against retroactivity applies only where a statute implicates substantive 
laws. By contrast, statutes that do not enlarge, dint mate oi destroy substantive rights can be 
applied retroactively." BAM. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 128 P.3d i IOI, 11 ^ :.»1 
2006) (internal citations omitted i I'mmlui al Law "prescribes the practice and procedure or the 
legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or n utile * fleet hi nr simply clarifies 
the legislature's previous intentions." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah App. 1998) 
(internal citations omitted). In this case she argues that the elunges were procedural, not 
substantive, because they simply provide that the legal machinery at work is not operation nl' law, 
but rather judicial action. Nhi- further ^upputh her contention that the change was procedural 
with citations to the floor debate about the 1996 amendment. 
The ccnn t is persuaded that the amendments in question were substantive—not 
procedural—and,-therefore, finds Ms. Hamblin's right was forfeited by operation of law in 1985 
and that, as a consequence, the State Engineer appropriately denied her Change Application. In 
making this finding, the court relies on the language from Nephi City stating that "under the plain 
terms of section 73-1-4, Nephi City's water rights were forfeited for nonuse hy operation t»/ law " 
779 P.2d at 674 < i hus, according to the Utah Supreme Court, the legal 
machinery at work under the former version of the statute was opera 1 i* u ml law, ai id the 1996 
amendment changed the legal machinery to judicial action. This court finds that such a change 
was substantive, not procedural, and Ihrrrfoiv. (h.il (IK amendments should not apply 
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retroactively to revive Ms. Hamblin's Water Right which was forfeited by operation of law in 
1985. In the face of Nephi City interpreting the pre-amendment statute, the court does not find 
the floor debate about the proposed amendment persuasive evidence regarding the proper way to 
interpret the statute.2 
Furthermore, the court finds that the amendments were substantive because Nephi City 
leaves little question about what the outcome of this case would have been if Ms. Hamblin had 
submitted her change application before the 1996 amendments were enacted. The parties do not 
dispute that the Water Right has gone unused since at least 1980, and they apparently do not 
dispute that no one applied for an extension of time before the five-year period of nonuse for the 
Water Right expired in 1985.3 Thus, if this court had analyzed this case under Nephi City 
anytime from 1986 to 1995, the State Engineer's motion for summary judgment would have been 
2
 This is especially true because the bill was circled after the discussion cited by the 
plaintiff. See Transcript of January 29, 1996 House Floor Debate on H.B. 69, attached as Exhibit 
F to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to State Engineer's Cross-Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
3
 In the undisputed facts sections of their memoranda, each party failed to include any 
information about whether Ms. Hamblin or anyone else filed for an extension of time for the 
Water Right. However, the parties apparently do not dispute this fact based on the information 
included in their exhibits. Ms. Hamblin included her Exhibit H, the State Engineer's 2008 order 
rejecting the Change Application, in which the State Engineer specifically states, "Here, no 
application for non-use was ever filed." The State Engineer included his Exhibit B, in which 
John Mann—the Regional Engineer for the Utah Lake Jordan River Region of Utah—states in 
affidavit form that u[t]he use of water under this water right has been discontinued for several 
years. No non-use application to prevent forfeiture had ever been filed for this water right 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4." In addition, during oral arguments, neither party argued 
that an extension had ever been filed. 
Therefore, the court assumes that no person, including Ms. Hamblin, filed for an 
extension of time for the Water Right during the relevant time periods. 
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granted, because under llu i k\u language oi tue forfeiture statute in place during those years, Ms. 
Hamblin's right would have been forfeited by operation of law as o» 1 ()XS Therefore to say that 
the amendments are simply procedural and "do not enlarge, eliminate or destroy substantive 
rights" ignores a basic analysis of how the statute was actually applied by the Utah Supreme 
Court before the amendments were enacted: before the 1996 amendment, this court would have 
found that the right was forfeited h\ npeiahon of law, and to grant Ms. Hamblin's request 
now—because of the current 2008 version of the statute—would *^« v a * considered 
forfeited by operation of law more than 20 years ago, thereby "enlarging" a substantive right. 
Finally, although the court agrees that \\r t^at< in? men df*s not have the authority to 
u uieu au * tier rights, the court does not find that denying a change application based on 
forfeiture under the previous forfeiture statute qualifies as adjudication where the period of 
nonuse is undisputed. Ms. Hamblin cites to a case in which the State Engineer declined in 
determine whether forfeiture had rendered a change application inappropriate. However, in that 
case, the person requesting the change application asserted that he was applying for an extension 
of time before his five-year period of nonuse expired. Glenwood Irrigation Co, v. Myers, 465 
P.2d 1013, 1014 (Utah 1970) (emphasis added) I he plaintiff filed a protest to the defendant's 
application, asserting that the defendant had already failed to use the water for more than II ve 
years. Id, In that conto 1, the Statr Engineer "stated that the burden of proof rested upon the one 
asserting abandonment or forfeiture of an existing right and Ihn! he could only conclude that the 
right existed os described in the decree." Id. The court finds Glenwood is inapposite because, in 
the case now before the court, the plaintiff - • • *: le has not used the Water Right since 
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1980. Therefore, the State Engineer simply recognized this undisputed fact and followed the 
applicable forfeiture statute. 
Based on the analysis above, the court grants the State Engineer's Motion for Summary 
Judgment by finding that under U.C.A. 73-3-3(2)(a), Ms. Hamblin is not a "person entitled to the 
use of water" because her Water Right was forfeited by operation of law in 1985, and, thus, her 
change application cannot be granted. Although the court finds that her change application 
should be denied on this basis and that the other arguments become moot as a consequence, the 
court addresses them below. 
II. Impairment and Available Water 
The State Engineer argues, from two different angles, in the second half of his motion 
that the Change Application should not be granted because doing so would impair other water 
users' rights. First, he argues that, because the Water Right has not been beneficially used since 
1980, Ms. Hamblin cannot meet the condition for permanent change applications found in 
U.C.A. 73-3-3 for relinquishment. Second, he argues that the plaintiffs Change Application 
cannot meet the requirements found in U.C.A. 73-3-3 and -8 to demonstrate available water in 
the basin and to prove that the change will not impair other water rights. 
A. Beneficial Use and Relinquishment Under U.C.A. 73-3-3 
The State Engineer cites U.C.A. 73-3-3(l)(a) for the proposition that a permanent 
change requires water users to relinquish a beneficial use. This section states, "'Permanent 
change' means a change for an indefinite period of time with an intent to relinquish the original 
point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use." Under this section, he argues that the water 
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right holder must relinquish the cuiieiif, 01 iecently observable, beneficial use before a permanent 
change application may be granted. Under that premise, regardless of whether the W.jte? Right 
has been I i >rf cited (by either operation of law or judicial action), the fact that the Water Right has 
not been put to beneficial use for at least iunih ni\hf veins means that the water under the right 
has been freed up for use by other users during that time period. And therefore, he argues, 
because Ms. Hamblin has no cui rent, beneficial use to relinquish, and because the water under 
her right has in fact been used by others, she cannot meet the requirements of 11 (' A /" \ • \ 
3(1 )(a). • ^ . 
Further, the State Engineer argues, because the water in iln I Jtah Valley area has been 
fully appropriated and the basin closed in 1995 to further appropriations, allowing Ms. Hamblin 
to put her water ngru < ^n^V. < would necessarily impair the rights of other water 
users who have been using the water from her right for decades. Because I Huh rejects * 
minimus standard foi impairment, any impairment to other users means that a change application 
must be rejected. See Piute Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. West l^mguit'h Irrigation & Reservoir 
Co., 367 P.2d 855, 858 (Utah 1962). 
Ms. Hamblin asserts that the State Engineer's impairment arguments are premised on 
the conclusion that the Water Right has ceased to exist as a result of forfeiture and. then i -
fails for the same reasons she uses to argue that the right has not been forfeited. The forfeiture 
arguments aside, she argues that her Change Applicatioi I does i i leet the i equirements oi i C.A. 
73-3 M! 1 )(a) because it sets forth the current right and the equivalent amount of water she 
requests to use in exchange. 
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As to impairment, she argues that the State Engineer has incorrectly asserted the burden 
of proof for establishing impairment for purposes of a change application. A change application 
may not be denied on the broad assertion that additional draws on the water system would impair 
other water users. Instead, she argues, under the holding in Searle v. Milburn Irr, Co,, the State 
Engineer should approve the application if there is reason to believe that the change can be, 
accomplished without impairing existing rights. 2006 UT 16, ^  31, 133 P.3d 382. Therefore, at 
this stage, Ms. Hamblin is required to show only that there is reason to believe the change can 
occur without impairment, and this court should not reject the application unless presented with 
evidence refuting that reason. 
Finally, Ms. Hamblin asserts that the State Engineer's argument that granting the 
Change Application would impair other water users because the basin has been closed to new 
appropriations since 1996 hinges on the forfeiture argument. She points out that the State 
Engineer has offered no evidence suggesting that the Division of Water Rights excluded the 
Water Right when it calculated the fixed withdrawal amount from then existing water rights 
appropriated in the Utah Valley system and closed the Utah Valley area to new appropriations. 
The court finds that the State Engineer's motion for summary judgment cannot be 
granted on the basis of the arguments he asserts under U.C.A. 73-3-3(1 )(a) or the arguments he 
asserts regarding impairment. First, although the State Engineer argues that U.C.A. 73-3-3(l)(a) 
requires the relinquishment of a current beneficial use, the court does not find that language 
anywhere in the statute. Rather, the statute requires the water user to "relinquish the original 
point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use." 
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The State Engineer would hau<" On.: < < HJI ( iidd (lie requirement that the relinquishment 
must be of a current proven beneficial use, but does not point the court to any authorily in case 
law support!!!}! this proposition. The court is unwilling to interpret the statute in this manner 
without more authority. Instead, the court finds that a plain leading ifthe sl.iiute inquires Ms. 
H.T.;K- .;« idinquish the original point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use," which 
she is apparently willing to do. (Emphasis added,) As staled elsewhere, the court finds that her 
Change Application should be denied on other grounds, but the court does not find that u.C.A. 
73-3-3(l)(a) can independently sup- ; ending 
Second, the court finds that the State Engineer's arguments regardinr inipainneft! are 
also nol mdependenlly sufficient to grant his motion for summary judgment. The standard for 
determining impairment is succinctly stated in Searlr, whern i 111< HI ih Supreme Court held 
that change applicants are required to show only reason to believe that 
impairment will not result from application approval, that the burden of 
persuasion remains on change applicants throughout the application process, 
and that circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently compelling to make 
application approval inappropriate. 
2006 I IT 1 (» at }\ 29. Using this standard, the court finds that granting the State Engineer's 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of impairment would be iniippinpriate because the 
undisputed facts before the court at this stage are insufficient to make an impairment 
determination. 
In essence, the Searle holding requires district courts to consider three issues when 
making an inip;mniriii del ei initiation, and this court finds that the evidence currently before it is 
insufficient to make these considerations. The first considerate MI IS W'" Iher Ms. Hamblin has 
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shown a reason to believe that impairment will not result from approving her application. The 
court finds that the undisputed facts before it on this motion do not provide enough evidence to 
make this determination. Secondly, this court must be careful to leave the burden of persuasion 
regarding whether granting Ms. Hamblin's Change Application would not result in impairment 
with Ms. Hamblin. From the posture of the State Engineer's arguments, he implicitly attempts to 
assume the burden of persuasion. However, his arguments could also be viewed as bearing on 
the third consideration, which is providing sufficiently compelling circumstantial evidence that 
would make application approval inappropriate. 
Under this third consideration, the court finds that the State Engineer has failed to 
provide sufficiently compelling circumstantial evidence that would make application approval 
inappropriate. The State Engineer has provided the court with explanations about the prior 
appropriation system and a big-picture analysis of why granting a change application based on an 
unused water right in a closed system would necessarily impair water users within that system, 
but that has all been done in the general sense. Based on the court's reading of Searle, the court 
does not find this analysis a sufficiently compelling reason, standing alone, to deny the change 
application. 
In Searle, the Court noted that the "district court, hearing evidence de novo, was 
supplied with testimony from three expert witnesses on the issue of impairment." Id. at % 8. 
These experts provided specific information about how the proposed change might impair 
specific users' rights. In contrast, this court currently has nothing before it other than general, 
abstract discussions about impairment that would result, in theory, if the change application were 
granted. Furthenm n\ HI discussing (he propei standard of review, the Searle court noted that 
'there are myriad factual scenarios, interplaying with complex scientific principles, thai eait ai ise 
when determining whether approval of a change application will result in impairment of vested 
rights . . . "Id. at 11 17. At this point , I he eoutl lias not been pinvidnl with enough specific 
information to aid it in examining the factual scenario in question, i.e., whether water users' 
rights in Highland City would aetually he impaired if the Change Application were approved. 
Thus, this court declines to make a determination about impairment .il the simmmtN judgment 
stage < m the, basis that the parties have not provided enough evidence, in the form of undisputed 
facts, for the court to conduct a proper analysis. 
5. Change Application Requirements Under U.C.A. 73-3-3 and -8. 
Under U.C.A. 73-3-3(5)(a), the St.it- aeineer "^h.. : ;- i>» die same procedures, and 
the rights and duties of the applicants with respect to applications for permanent changes ot point 
of diversion place of use, or purpose of use shall be the same, as provided in this title for 
applications to appropriate water [Section 73-3-8]." The State \ \iiinn oi argues I hat Ms. 
Hamblin's change application cannot meet at least two of the requirements found in U.C.A. 73-
3-8(l)(a)(i) and (ii)—specifically, that she eaiinol demon: n.in mai -here is unappropriated water 
in the proposed source" and that "the proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere 
with the nioie benelii i,tl use of water," The court addresses each below. 
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i. The requirements to demonstrate available water under 
U.C.A. 73-3-8(1 )(a) 
In Tanner v. Humphreys, the Utah Supreme Court discussed a change application and 
found that the applicant demonstrated that there was unappropriated water at the proposed source 
by exchanging her old use for the new use, not by actually proving that the new source contained 
sufficient water. 48 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah 1935). The Court further found "that all that the 
plaintiff asked and all that she could get was an exchange of the waters which she had under her 
right." Id. at 488. This court relies on its earlier forfeiture analysis and finds that because Ms. 
Hamblin no longer has a valid right to exchange, she cannot demonstrate that there is 
unappropriated water at the proposed source. Furthermore, because the parties agree that the 
basin is fully appropriated, she cannot otherwise demonstrate that unappropriated water exists in 
the proposed source absent an exchange from another existing water right. Thus, finding that Ms. 
Hamblin cannot satisfy one of the requirements of U.C. A. 73-3-8(1 )(a), the court grants the State 
Engineer's motion for summary judgment on this additional basis. 
ii. The requirement to demonstrate lack of impairment under 
U.C.A. 73-3-8(l)(a) 
As discussed in detail above, the court declines to make an impairment determination 
on summary judgment because the facts before the court are insufficient to properly analyze 
whether or not impairment would actually occur. 
III. Entitlement to File 
Having found above that Ms. Hamblin's Water Right was forfeited by operation of 
law in 1985, the court also finds that she is not a "person entitled to the use of water," and, 
is 1200 
therefore, that SIP- <loe- • M** «iu el llie filing prerequisite found in U.C.A. 73-3-3(2)(a). The court 
finds further support for this conclusion in Utah Supreme ("unit's ehiitieatioii HI Strawberry 
Watei M / \ /l.v.\<.» Bureau of Reclamation "that Prisbrey should not be read as undermining 
the importance of use as a basis for filing a change .ipplicatii MI under I Jtah's statutory scheme." 
2006 IJT 19, % 40, 133 P.3d 410 (citing Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 2003 UI 56, ffi[ 
23-25, 82 P.3d I I I'l|" i ' I luis, thr i. < M n t denies this portion of the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
apliance with Statutory Requirements to File a Change Application 
As an initial matter, the court notes V l " • * H. :n complied with the 
statutory requirements for filling out the Change Application form under U.C.A. 73-3-3(4)(b) is 
moot based on its earlier findings icgauling lorfeiture. Nevertheless, the court finds that she 
complied with the requirements insofar as was possible and, thui . • • a < ^ h * 
Plaintiff's Cross-A i- * -. • r Partial Summary Judgment. 
Under U.C.A. 73-3-3(4)(b), change applicants are i« quieal IO set forth nine items. The 
plaintiff complains that the State Engineer incorrectly found that she did not comply with sub-
parts (4)(b)(v) and (vii). Under (v), applicants are required to list "if applicable, the point on the 
stream or water source where the water is diverted." Under (vii), applicants are required t 
"the place, pui pose, and extent of the present use." The court finds that the former requirement 
was not applicable because, as the parties agree, there was no point nl'd nsioi i Apparently no 
living person has a memory of the point of diversion, but the court also notes that the point of 
diversion was not listed in the original clen n* flu ntni finds that listing the latter information 
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listed in sub-part (vii) would have been impossible because, again as the parties agree, there is no 
present use. The court recognizes that the lack of a present use is necessarily connected to the 
rest of the State Engineer's arguments, but does not find that, standing alone, the failure of a 
party to list a present use should be a reason to deny a change application. The underlying reason 
for denying the change application, which is forfeiture as the court found above, has already been 
appropriately addressed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Ms. Hamblin's Water Right was forfeited by operation of law as of 1985 because 
of non-use, and thus, she is not a person entitled to file a change application under U.C.A. 73-3-
3(2)(a). 
2. The court does not have enough evidence before it on these motions for summary 
judgment to determine whether granting Ms. Hamblin's Change Application would result in 
impairment to other water users. 
3. Because Ms. Hamblin's water right has been forfeited, she cannot satisfy the 
requirement in U.C.A. 73-3-8(1 )(a) to demonstrate that there is available water in the proposed 
source. 
4. Ms. Hamblin's change application form complied with U.C.A. 73-3-3(4)(b), and 
her application should not be denied on the basis of missing information on the form. 
1198 
ORDER 
1. The court grants the State Engineer's Motion /< n Summit t i« htJ^mcni i m the basis 
of forfeiture, 
2. The court denies the Plaintiff "s ( > ass Molionfor Summary Judgment concluding 
that she is not a person entitled to file a change application under U.C.A. 73-3-3(2)00 
Dated this 13th day of July, 2009 
-** i i ; 
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73-1-4 WATER AND IRRIGATION 
appropriated. However, the appropriator 
does not own the salt The salt which it seeks 
is contained within Great Salt Lake, which is 
a navigable body of water. Because it is a 
navigable body of water, its bed belongs to 
the state subject to the control of Congress 
for navigation in commerce. Deseret Live-
stock Co. v. State (1946) 110 U 239,171 P 2d 
401. 
Waters diverted from natural source, 
applied to irrigation and recaptured before 
escaping from original appropriates con-
trol, still belong to original appropriator and, 
if original appropriator has beneficial use for 
such waters, he may again reuse them and no 
one can acquire right superior to that of 
original appropriator. Smithfield West Bench 
Irrigation Co. v. Union Central life Ins. Co. 
(1948) 113 U 356, 195 P 2d 249, prior appeal 
105 U 468,142 P 2d 866, distinguished 2 U 2d 
170, 271 P 2d 449. 
An appropriator of water may in good 
faith utilize the quantity of water to which 
he is entitled, although his previous methods 
of use were inefficient, and resulted in 
returning surplus or waste water into the 
stream. Lasson v. Seely (1951) 120 U 679, 238 
P 2d 418, distinguished 2 U 2d 170, 271 P 2d 
449. 
In order to preserve his right to use water 
which he is entitled to use as a shareholder 
of an irrigation company, a landowner must 
keep that water not only on his own land, but 
also under his control. Lasson v. Seely (1951) 
120 U 679,238 P 2d 418. 
While irrigation water is under his domin-
ion and control, a shareholder in an irri-
gation company who has the right to draw on 
a certain portion of the irrigation canal 
stream is entitled to use it on his own land in 
such beneficial manner as he sees fit, or he 
may use it or any part thereof on other land 
under his control, or he may lease to others 
the right to use such water or some portion 
thereof. Lasson v. Seely (1951) 120 U 679,238 
P 2d 418, distinguished 2 U 2d 170, 271 P 2d 
449. 
The right of an appropriator of public 
waters to the use thereof is subject to regula-
tion and limited to the amount required with 
reasonable efficiency to satisfy the beneficial 
use of his appropriation. McNaughton v. 
Eaton (1952) 121 U 394,242 P 2d 570. 
A change in place of diversion or the place 
or nature of use or a combination of such 
changes cannot be made if the vested rights 
of lower users would be impaired thereby. 
East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co. (1954) 
2 U 2d 170,271 P 2d 449. 
Who may complain. 
Prior appropriator cannot prevent use of 
surplus waters; that is, he cannot prevent 
another from using water while he cannot 
use it or make it available for use. Geary v. 
Daniels (1917) 50 U 494,167 P 820. 
The grantor of water rights will not be 
heard to say that his grantee cannot make 
beneficial use thereof. Campbell v. Nunn 
(1931) 78 U 316, 2 P 2d 899. 
Water which is lost by seepage and evapo-
ration before it gets to adverse claimant's 
land cannot be beneficially used by him, and, 
therefore, applicant for appropriation of such 
water, by taking such waters, cannot deprive 
claimant thereof. Sigurd City v. State (1943) 
105 U 278,142 P 2d 154, criticized in Moyle v. 
Salt Lake City (1947) 111 U 201,176 P 2d 882. 
Law Reviews. 
What Is Beneficial Use of Water, by 
Samuel C. Wiel, 3 Calif. L. Rev. 460. 
73-1-4. Reversion to public by abandonment or failure to use 
within five years — Extending time. When an appropriator or his succes-
sor in interest shall abandon or cease to use water for a period of five years 
the right shall cease and thereupon such water shall revert to the public, 
and may be again appropriated as provided in this title, unless before the 
expiration of such five-year period the appropriator or his successor in 
interest shall have filed with the state engineer a verified application for 
an extension of time, not to exceed five years, within which to resume the 
use of such water and unless pursuant to such application the time within 
which such nonuse may continue is extended by the state engineer as here-
inafter provided. The provisions of this section are applicable whether such 
unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to waste or is used by 
others without right. The filing of such application for extension of time 
shall extend the time during which nonuse may continue until the order 
10 
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of the state engineer thereon. Such application shall be on a blank to be 
furnished by the state engineer and shall set forth such information as 
he may require, including but not limiting to the following: The name and 
address of applicant; the name of the source from which the right is 
claimed and the point" on such source where the water was last diverted; 
evidence of the validity of the right claimed by reference to application 
number in the state engineer's office; date of court decree and title of case; 
or the date when the water was first used; the place, time and nature of 
past use; the flow of water which has been used in second-feet or the quan-
tity stored in acre-feet and the time the water was used each year; the 
extension of time applied for, together with a statement of the reason for 
the nonuse of such water. Similar applications may be made from time 
to time, before the date of expiration of the extension next theretofore 
granted. 
Upon receipt of such application the state engineer shall cause to be pub-
lished, once each week for three successive weeks, in a newspaper of gen-
eral circulation in the county in which source of water supply is located, 
a notice of the application, which notice shall apprise the public of the 
nature of the right for which the extension is sought and the reasons 
therefor. 
Any person interested may at any time after the first publication of such 
notice and prior to the thirtieth day after completion of publication, file 
with the state engineer a written protest, together with a copy thereof, 
against the granting of such extension of time, stating the reasons there-
for, which shall be duly considered by the state engineer, and, after such 
further investigation as the state engineer deems necessary, he shall allow 
or reject the application. 
Such applications for extension shall be granted by the state engineer 
for periods not exceeding five years each, upon a showing of reasonable 
cause for such nonuse. Financial crisis, industrial depression, operation of 
legal proceedings or other unavoidable cause, or the holding of a water 
right without use by any municipality, metropolitan water districts or 
other public agencies to meet the reasonable future requirements of the 
public, shall constitute reasonable cause for such nonuse. 
Sixty days before the expiration of any such period of extension of time, 
the state engineer shall notify the applicant by registered mail of the date 
when such period of extension will expire. Before such date of expiration 
such applicant shall file a verified statement with the state engineer setting 
forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, and such further 
information as may be relevant and be required by the blank form which 
shall be furnished by the state engineer for said purpose, or such applicant 
shall make application for further extension of time in which to resume 
use of the water as provided in this section, otherwise such water right 
shall cease and thereupon the water shall revert to the public. 
i J ? i s t o r y : k 1919» ch* 67» § $ R- S- 1933> C- 1943> 100-1-4; L. 1945, ch. 134, § 1; 1959, ch. 
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*** ARCHIVE MATERIAL *** 
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1995) 
§ 73-1-4. Reversion to public by abandonment or failure to use within five years — Extending time 
(1) (a) When an appropriator or his successor in interest abandons or ceases to use water for a period of five years, the 
right ceases, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, the appropriator or his successor in interest files a 
verified application for an extension of time with the state engineer. 
(b) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years unless the time is further 
extended by the state engineer. 
(c) The provisions of this section are applicable whether the unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to 
waste or is used by others without right. 
(2) (a) The state engineer shall furnish an application blank that includes a space for: 
(i) the name and address of the applicant; 
(ii) the name of the source from which the right is claimed and the point on that source where the water was last 
diverted; 
(iii) evidence of the validity of the right claimed by reference to application number in the state engineer's 
office; 
(iv) date of court decree and title of case, or the date when the water was first used; 
(v) the place, time, and nature of past use; 
(vi) the flow of water that has been used in second-feet or the quantity stored in acre-feet; 
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(vii) the time the water was used each year; 
(viii) the extension of time applied for; 
(ix) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water; and 
(x) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(b) Filing the application extends the time during which nonuse may continue until the state engineer issues his 
order on the application for an extension of time. 
(c) (i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish, once a week for two successive weeks, a 
notice of the application in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of the water supply is 
located and where the water is to be used. 
(ii) The notice may be published in more than one newspaper. 
(iii) The notice shall inform the public of the nature of the right for which the extension is sought and the 
reasons for the extension. 
(d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the granting of the application: 
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is informal; and 
(ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal. 
(e) In any proceedings to determine whether the application for extension should be approved or rejected, the 
state engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application. 
(3) (a) Applications for extension shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not exceeding five years each, 
upon a showing of reasonable cause for nonuse. 
(b) Reasonable causes for nonuse include: 
(i) financial crisis; 
(ii) industrial depression; 
(iii) operation of legal proceedings or other unavoidable cause; and 
(iv) the holding of a water right without use by any municipality, metropolitan water district, or other public 
agency to meet the reasonable future requirements of the public. 
(4) (a) If the appropriator or his successor in interest fails to apply for an extension of time, or if the state engineer 
denies the application for extension of time, the appropriator's water right ceases. 
(b) When the appropriator's water right ceases, the water reverts to the public and may be reappropriated as 
provided in this title. 
(5) (a) Sixty days before the expiration of any extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by 
registered mail of the date when the extension period will expire. 
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(b) Before the date of expiration, the applicant shall either: 
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, 
and whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; or 
(ii) apply for a further extension of time in which to resume use of the water according to the procedures and 
requirements of this section. 
HISTORY: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 6; R.S. 1933,100-1-4; L. 1935, ch. 104, § 1; 1939, ch. I l l , § 1; C. 1943,100-1-4; L. 
1945, ch. 134, § 1; 1959, ch. 137, § 1; 1987, ch. 161, § 287; 1988, ch. 72, § 28; 1995, ch. 19, § 1. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1987 amendment, effective January 1,1988, rewrote and redesignated this 
section to such an extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "30 days" for "20 days" in Subsection (2)(d) and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated the second sentence of Subsection (l)(b) as (l)(c); 
subdivided Subsection (2)(c); substituted "two" for "three" before "successive weeks" and added "and where water is to 
be used" in Subsection (2)(c)(i); added Subsections (2)(c)(ii), (2)(d)(i), and (2)(d)(ii); and made related and stylistic 
changes throughout. 
COMPILER'S NOTES. -This section was Comp. Laws 1907, § 1288x23. 
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Forfeiture of water rights by nonuse under this section does not violate Utah Const., Art. XI, § 6, because the 
constitution only prohibits the voluntary, intentional disposition of water rights, whereas a forfeiture under this section 
is involuntary. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 R2d 673 (Utah 1989). 
IN GENERAL. 
For discussion of the concepts of abandonment and forfeiture of water rights, the distinction between abandonment 
and forfeiture of water rights and loss of rights to another by prescription or adverse use, and the requirements for and 
proof of a water right by adverse use, see Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 
448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 (1943); In re Drainage Area of Bear River, 12 Utah 
2d 1,361 P.2d407 (1961). 
The development of water in this arid state requires strict adherence to statutory sanctions, without delay or 
nonconformance thereto, except in rare and highly equitable instances. Bough v. Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 
(1967). 
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ABANDONMENT. 
Abandonment of a water right requires an intent to abandon, coupled with some act of relinquishment by which the 
intent is carried out. Promontory Ranch Co. v. Argile, 28 Utah 398, 79 P. 47 (1904); Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 
66P.2d894(1937). 
In action to determine title to waters of a spring having its source on plaintiffs' land, fact that neither plaintiffs nor 
their grantors made any use of the water, and permitted it to continue to flow through an artificial watercourse which 
they had purchased from one having a right thereto, was not sufficient to show abandonment, so as to render the water 
subject to appropriation, especially in view of other affirmative acts of plaintiffs tending to show that they had no 
intention of abandoning their rights. Gill v. Malan, 29 Utah 431, 82 P. 471 (1905). 
Abandonment, as applied to doctrine of appropriation of water to a beneficial use, means an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
Abandonment of water rights is not based upon a time element, and mere nonuse will not establish abandonment for 
any less time, at least, than the statutory period, the controlling element being a matter of intent. Hammond v. Johnson, 
94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
In action to quiet title to waters of a spring, finding of court that defendants said plaintiff was stealing their water 
negated an abandonment of the water by defendants, so it could not revert to public and again be subject to 
appropriation. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
Abandonment is a separate and distinct concept from that of a forfeiture. Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah448, 137P.2d634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah498, 143 P.2d 278 (1943); In re 
Drainage Area of Bear River, 12 Utah 2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961). 
The burden is on the person asserting abandonment of water rights to prove it and proof of abandonment must fail in 
absence of showing of an intent to abandon. Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 
Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 (1943); Smithfield W. Bench Irrigation Co. v. 
Union Cent Life Ins. Co., 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948); Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson, 122 Utah 225, 247 
P.2d 1004 (1952); In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
Abandonment differs from the nonuse provided by this section in that abandonment requires proof of an intent to 
abandon the water right. In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Adverse possession is not founded upon or dependent on the doctrines of abandonment, or forfeiture for nonuse, of 
water rights. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
APPROPRIATION AFTER FORFEITURE. 
When vested right is forfeited by nonuse, there is reversion to public, and right to use water so abandoned can only be 
initiated by making new appropriation after water is available for appropriation. Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 
P.2d 954 (1949). 
FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS. 
Nonuser of appropriated waters for statutory period, as well as intentional abandonment, results in loss of rights 
thereto. Deseret Livestock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479 (1925). 
Forfeiture of a water right for nonuser during the statutory time may occur despite a specific intent not to surrender 
the right, since it is based, not upon an act done, or an intent had, but upon failure to use the right for the statutory time. 
Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66P.2d894 (1937). 
Forfeiture will not operate when the failure to use is a result of physical causes beyond the control of the appropriator, 
such as floods that destroy his dams and ditches, troughs, and the like, if the appropriator is ready and willing to divert 
the water when it is naturally available. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 
108 (citing textbooks, decisions from other western states, and federal court cases), rehearing denied, 104 Utah 216, 140 
P.2d 638 (1943). 
Under Laws of 1880 (Laws 1880, ch. 20, § 9), failure to keep a dam in repair, or failure to use the water for seven 
years, would work a forfeiture. Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 
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P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498,143 P.2d 278 (1943). 
Under this section a forfeiture is based upon the failure to use the water. Accordingly, there is no forfeiture where 
there is no showing that appropriator or his successor in interest has failed to use the water for a beneficial purpose for a 
period of five years. This principle does not, however, imply that an appropriator can, without getting the approval of 
the state engineer, change the nature of the use or the place of diversion. Nor may an appropriator who has a 
supplemental storage right, without completing construction of storage facilities in the allotted time, and without getting 
an extension of time for the completion of construction, keep his storage right alive indefinitely by making direct flow 
diversions from the river. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638 (1943). 
Pledgee of certificate of mutual irrigation company cannot be charged with abandonment by nonuser because 
certificate was not used for a period of more than five years, where certificate was void, and, therefore, the holder 
thereof was never entitled to any water rights thereunder. In other words, the right to the use of water cannot logically 
be said to have been lost by nonuse when in fact the right never had any legal existence. Commercial Bank v. Spanish 
ForkS. Irrigation Co., 107 Utah 279, 153 P.2d547 (1944). 
Statutes fixing the maximum time limit for the nonuser of a water right, when free from ambiguity, should be strictly 
construed, and a case clearly made out before any relief should be extended to the delinquent thereunder. Baugh v. 
Cuddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 (1967). 
Town's leasing of its water right in violation of Utah Const., Art. XI, § 6, did not work a statutory forfeiture of the 
town's water right where the water was apparently contaminated and generally unsuitable for culinary use and the lease 
arrangement at least insured that the water was beneficially used for irrigation, with no actual loss to the town's citizens 
because the technology to render the water usable for town purposes was apparently not available during the term of the 
lease. Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). 
GROUND WATER. 
Before the 1945 amendment, this section did not apply to underground or subterranean waters. Fairfield Irrigation 
Co. v. Carson, 122 Utah 225, 247 P.2d 1004 (1952). 
The prior exemption of underground waters in this section indicated a recognition of some kind of personal right to 
such waters and this legislative disposition to protect the right was emphasized by the passage of the statute giving 
landowners one year in which to file claims to such waters (§ 73-5-10, repealed by Laws 1955, ch. 160, § 2). In re 
Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 6 Utah 2d 344, 313 P.2d 803 (1957). 
TIME EXTENSION. 
State engineer's proposed determination in a drainage area which disallowed plaintiffs' water rights in their wells 
interrupted the running of this section against the plaintiffs and the fact that plaintiffs did not file a protest within five 
years after the effective date of the statute was not controlling since they did file within the time extended by the court. 
In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
Right to use water nonconsumptively to run power mill wheel lapsed when owner failed to file engineer's form stating 
that beneficial use had been resumed within extension of time to resume granted when mill burned down, 
notwithstanding argument that resumption of use had actually occurred within extension period. Baugh v. Criddle, 19 
Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 (1967). 
Party applying to state engineer for extension of time in which to resume use of water does not have to pay filing fee 
in advance. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Myers, 24 Utah 2d 78, 465 P2d 1013 (1970). 
In action to have defendant's right to use water declared forfeited for nonuse and to enjoin any further use, trial court 
improperly granted summary judgment for plaintiff since state engineer had granted extension of time for defendant to 
resume use and plaintiff did not use proper remedy of civil action in district court for review of state engineer's decision, 
but rather filed action to have defendant's rights declared forfeited, which resulted in an attempt by plaintiff to exercise 
authority granted specifically to state engineer to enjoin unlawful diversion. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Myers, 24 Utah 
2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970). 
WASTE WATER. 
Portion of appropriated water allowed to run waste cannot be appropriated by another unless owner intentionally 
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abandons right to its use, or fails to apply it to beneficial purpose for statutory period, and owner may reclaim exclusive 
rights to such water by applying it to beneficial use at any time before lapse of statutory period, in absence of earlier 
intentional abandonment of rights thereto. Torsakv. Rukavina, 67 Utah 166, 246 P. 367 (1926). 
Question of waste water or excess water is discussed at length in majority and concurring opinions in Smithfield W. 
Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468,142 P.2d 866 (1943). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
UTAH LAW REVIEW. -The Failure of Subdivision Control in the Western United States: A Blueprint for Local 
Government Action, 1988 UtahL. Rev. 569. 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND POLICY. -Legal Impediments to Interstate Water Marketing: Application to 
Utah, 9 J. Energy L. & PoVy237 (1989). 
Nephi City v. Hansen : The Utah Supreme Court Sidesteps Public Trust Principles in Allowing Forfeiture of 
Municipal Water Rights, 11 J. Energy L. & PoVy 369 (1991). 
AM. JUR. 2D. -78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters §§ 240,342. 
C.J.S. -93 C.J.S. Waters § 193. 
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TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1996) 
§ 73-1-4. Reversion to public by abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse within five years — Extension of time 
(1) (a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases to use water for a period of 
five years, the water right ceases and the water reverts to the public, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, 
the appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest files a verified application for an extension of time with the 
state engineer. 
(b) (i) A water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial action to declare the right forfeited is commenced 
within 15 years from the end of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years. 
(ii) If forfeiture is asserted in an action for general determination of rights in conformance with the provisions 
of Chapter 4, the 15-yfear limitation period shall commence to run back in time from the date the state engineer's 
proposed determination of rights is served upon each claimant. 
(iii) A decree entered in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4 shall bar any claim of 
forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right determined to be valid in the decree. 
(c) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years unless the time is further 
extended by the state engineer. 
(d) The provisions of this section are applicable whether the unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to 
waste or is used by others without right. 
(2) (a) The state engineer shall furnish an application blank that includes a space for: 
(i) the name and address of the applicant; 
(ii) the name of the source from which the right is claimed and the point on that source where the water was last 
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diverted; 
(iii) evidence of the validity of the right claimed by reference to application number in the state engineer's 
office; 
(iv) date of court decree and title of case, or the date when the water was first used; 
(v) the place, time, and nature of past use; 
(vi) the flow of water that has been used in second-feet or the quantity stored in acre-feet; 
(vii) the time the water was used each year; 
(viii) the extension of time applied for; 
(ix) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water; and 
(x) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(b) Filing the application extends the time during which nonuse may continue until the state engineer issues his 
order on the application for an extension of time. 
(c) (i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish, once a week for two successive weeks, a 
notice of the application in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of the water supply is 
located and where the water is to be used. 
(ii) The notice may be published in more than one newspaper. 
(iii) The notice shall inform the public of the nature of the right for which the extension is sought and the 
reasons for the extension. 
(d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the granting of the application: 
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is informal; and 
(ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal. 
(e) In any proceedings to determine whether the application for extension should be approved or rejected, the 
state engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application. 
(3) (a) Applications for extension shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not exceeding five years each, 
upon a showing of reasonable cause for nonuse. 
(b) Reasonable causes for nonuse include: 
(i) financial crisis; 
(ii) industrial depression; 
(iii) operation of legal proceedings or other unavoidable cause; and 
(iv) the holding of a water right without use by any municipality, metropolitan water district, or other public 
Utah Code Ann. §73-1-4 
Page 3 
agency to meet the reasonable future requirements of the public. 
(4) (a) Sixty days before the expiration of any extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by 
registered mail of the date when the extension period will expire. 
(b) Before the date of expiration, the applicant shall either: 
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, 
and whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; or 
(ii) apply for a further extension of time in which to resume use of the water according to the procedures and 
requirements of this section. 
(5) (a) The appropriator's water right ceases and the water reverts to the public if the: 
(i) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for an extension of time; 
(ii) state engineer denies the application for extension of time; or 
(Hi) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for a further extension of time. 
HISTORY: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 6; R.S. 1933, 100-1-4; L. 1935, ch. 104, § 1; 1939, ch. I l l , § 1; C. 1943, 100-1-4; L. 
1945, ch. 134, § 1; 1959, ch. 137, § 1; 1987, ch. 161, § 287; 1988, ch. 72, § 28; 1995, ch. 19, § 1; 1996, ch. 98, § 1. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote and redesignated this 
section to such an extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "30 days" for "20 days" in Subsection (2)(d) and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated the second sentence of Subsection (l)(b) as (l)(c); 
subdivided Subsection (2)(c); substituted "two" for "three" before "successive weeks" and added "and where water is to 
be used" in Subsection (2)(c)(i); added Subsections (2)(c)(ii), (2)(d)(i), and (2)(d)(ii); and made related and stylistic 
changes throughout 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection (l)(a), substituted "water right ceases and the water 
reverts to the public" for "the right ceases"; added Subsection (l)(b), and redesignated subsequent subsections 
accordingly; redesignated former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4) and former Subsection (4) as Subsection (5); added 
Subsection (5)(iii); and made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
COMPILER'S NOTES. -This section was Comp. Laws 1907, § 1288x23. 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
Forfeiture of water rights by nonuse under this section does not violate Utah Const., Art. XI, § 6, because the 
constitution only prohibits the voluntary, intentional disposition of water rights, whereas a forfeiture under this section 
is involuntary. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P2d 673 (Utah 1989). 
IN GENERAL. 
For discussion of the concepts of abandonment and forfeiture of water rights, the distinction between abandonment 
and forfeiture of water rights and loss of rights to another by prescription or adverse use, and the requirements for and 
proof of a water right by adverse use, see Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 
448,137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498,143 P.2d 278 (1943); In re Drainage Area of Bear River, 12 Utah 
2d 1,361 P.2d407 (1961). 
The development of water in this arid state requires strict adherence to statutory sanctions, without delay or 
nonconformance thereto, except in rare and highly equitable instances. Bough v. Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 
(1967). 
ABANDONMENT. 
Abandonment of a water right requires an intent to abandon, coupled with some act of relinquishment by which the 
intent is carried out. Promontory Ranch Co. v. Argile, 28 Utah 398, 79 P. 47 (1904); Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 
66P.2d894(1937). 
In action to determine title to waters of a spring having its source on plaintiffs' land, fact that neither plaintiffs nor 
their grantors made any use of the water, and permitted it to continue to flow through an artificial watercourse which 
they had purchased from one having a right thereto, was not sufficient to show abandonment, so as to render the water 
subject to appropriation, especially in view of other affirmative acts of plaintiffs tending to show that they had no 
intention of abandoning their rights. Gill v. Malan, 29 Utah 431, 82 P. 471 (1905). 
Abandonment, as applied to doctrine of appropriation of water to a beneficial use, means an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
Abandonment of water rights is not based upon a time element, and mere nonuse will not establish abandonment for 
any less time, at least, than the statutory period, the controlling element being a matter of intent. Hammond v. Johnson, 
94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d894 (1937). 
In action to quiet title to waters of a spring, finding of court that defendants said plaintiff was stealing their water 
negated an abandonment of the water by defendants, so it could not revert to public and again be subject to 
appropriation. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
Abandonment is a separate and distinct concept from that of a forfeiture. Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay 
Land& Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d278 (1943); In re 
Drainage Area of Bear River, 12 Utah 2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961). 
The burden is on the person asserting abandonment of water rights to prove it and proof of abandonment must fail in 
absence of showing of an intent to abandon. Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 
Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 (1943); Smithfield W. Bench Irrigation Co. v. 
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d249 (1948); Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson, 122 Utah 225, 247 
P.2d 1004 (1952); In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
Abandonment differs from the nonuse provided by this section in that abandonment requires proof of an intent to 
abandon the water right. In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Adverse possession is not founded upon or dependent on the doctrines of abandonment, or forfeiture for nonuse, of 
water rights. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
APPROPRIATION AFTER FORFEITURE. 
When vested right is forfeited by nonuse, there is reversion to public, and right to use water so abandoned can only be 
initiated by making new appropriation after water is available for appropriation. Whi\..~re v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 
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P.2d954 (1949). 
FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS. 
Nonuser of appropriated waters for statutory period, as well as intentional abandonment, results in loss of rights 
thereto. Deseret Livestock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25t 239 P. 479 (1925). 
Forfeiture of a water right for nonuser during the statutory time may occur despite a specific intent not to surrender 
the right, since it is based, not upon an act done, or an intent had, but upon failure to use the right for the statutory time. 
Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
Forfeiture will not operate when the failure to use is a result of physical causes beyond the control of the appropriator, 
such as floods that destroy his dams and ditches, troughs, and the like, if the appropriator is ready and willing to divert 
the water when it is naturally available. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202,135 P. 2d 
108 (citing textbooks, decisions from other western states, and federal court cases), rehearing denied, 104 Utah 216,140 
P2d 638 (1943). 
Under Laws of 1880 (Laws 1880, ch. 20, § 9), failure to keep a dam in repair, or failure to use the water for seven 
years, would work a forfeiture. WellsvilleE. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 
P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 (1943). 
Under this section a forfeiture is based upon the failure to use the water. Accordingly, there is no forfeiture where 
there is no showing that appropriator or his successor in interest has failed to use the water for a beneficial purpose for a 
period of five years. This principle does not, however, imply that an appropriator can, without getting the approval of 
the state engineer, change the nature of the use or the place of diversion. Nor may an appropriator who has a 
supplemental storage right, without completing construction of storage facilities in the allotted time, and without getting 
an extension of time for the completion of construction, keep his storage right alive indefinitely by making direct flow 
diversions from the river. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638 (1943). 
Pledgee of certificate of mutual irrigation company cannot be charged with abandonment by nonuser because 
certificate was not used for a period of more than five years, where certificate was void, and, therefore, the holder 
thereof was never entitled to any water rights thereunder. In other words, the right to the use of water cannot logically 
be said to have been lost by nonuse when in fact the right never had any legal existence. Commercial Bank v. Spanish 
Fork S. Irrigation Co., 107 Utah 279, 153 P.2d 547 (1944). 
Statutes fixing the maximum time limit for the nonuser of a water right, when free from ambiguity, should be strictly 
construed, and a case clearly made out before any relief should be extended to the delinquent thereunder. Baugh v. 
Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 (1967). 
Town's leasing of its water right in violation of Utah Const., Art. XI, § 6, did not work a statutory forfeiture of the 
town's water right where the water was apparently contaminated and generally unsuitable for culinary use and the lease 
arrangement at least insured that the water was beneficially used for irrigation, with no actual loss to the town's citizens 
because the technology to render the water usable for town purposes was apparently not available during the term of the 
lease. Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). 
GROUND WATER. 
Before the 1945 amendment, this section did not apply to underground or subterranean waters. Fairfield Irrigation 
Co. v. Carson, 122 Utah 225, 247 P.2d 1004 (1952). 
The prior exemption of underground waters in this section indicated a recognition of some kind of personal right to 
such waters and this legislative disposition to protect the right was emphasized by the passage of the statute giving 
landowners one year in which to file claims to such waters (§ 73-5-10, repealed by Laws 1955, ch. 160, § 2). In re 
Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 6 Utah 2d 344, 313 P.2d 803 (1957). 
TIME EXTENSION. 
State engineer's proposed determination in a drainage area which disallowed plaintiffs' water rights in their wells 
interrupted the running of this section against the plaintiffs and the fact that plaintiffs did not file a protest within five 
years after the effective date of the statute was not controlling since they did file within the time extended by the court. 
In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
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Right to use water nonconsumptively to run power mill wheel lapsed when owner failed to file engineer's form stating 
that beneficial use had been resumed within extension of time to resume granted when mill burned down, 
notwithstanding argument that resumption of use had actually occurred within extension period. Baugh v. Criddle, 19 
Utah 2d 361, 431 R2d 790 (1967). 
Party applying to state engineer for extension of time in which to resume use of water does not have to pay filing fee 
in advance. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Myers, 24 Utah 2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970). 
In action to have defendant's right to use water declared forfeited for nonuse and to enjoin any further use, trial court 
improperly granted summary judgment for plaintiff since state engineer had granted extension of time for defendant to 
resume use and plaintiff did not use proper remedy of civil action in district court for review of state engineer's decision, 
but rather filed action to have defendant's rights declared forfeited, which resulted in an attempt by plaintiff to exercise 
authority granted specifically to state engineer to enjoin unlawful diversion. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Myers, 24 Utah 
2d 78, 465 R2d 1013 (1970). 
WASTE WATER. 
Portion of appropriated water allowed to run waste cannot be appropriated by another unless owner intentionally 
abandons right to its use, or fails to apply it to beneficial purpose for statutory period, and owner may reclaim exclusive 
rights to such water by applying it to beneficial use at any time before lapse of statutory period, in absence of earlier 
intentional abandonment of rights thereto. Torsak v. Rukavina, 67 Utah 166, 246 P. 367 (1926). 
Question of waste water or excess water is discussed at length in majority and concurring opinions in Smithfield W. 
Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943). 
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TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (2004) 
§ 73-1-4. Reversion to the public by abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse within five years — Extension of time 
(1) In order to further the state policy of securing the maximum use and benefit of its scarce water resources, a person 
entitled to the use of water has a continuing obligation to place all of a water right to beneficial use. The forfeiture of all 
or part of any right to use water for failure to place all or part of the water to beneficial use makes possible the 
allocation and use of water consistent with long established beneficial use concepts. The provisions of Subsections (2) 
through (6) shall be construed to carry out the purposes and policies set forth in this Subsection (1). 
(2) As used in this section, "public water supply entity" means an entity that supplies water as a utility service or for 
irrigation purposes and is also: 
(a) a municipality, water conservancy district, metropolitan water district, irrigation district created under Section 
17A-2-701.5, or other public agency; 
(b) a water company regulated by the Public Service Commission; or 
(c) any other owner of a community water system. 
(3) (a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of 
a water right for a period of five years, the water right or the unused portion of that water right ceases and the water 
reverts to the public, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, the appropriator or the appropriator's 
successor in interest files a verified nonuse application with the state engineer. 
(b) (i) A nonuse application may be filed on all or a portion of the water right, including water rights held by 
mutual irrigation companies. 
(ii) Public water supply entities that own stock in a mutual water company, after giving written notice to the 
water company, may file nonuse applications with the state engineer on the water represented by the stock. 
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(c) (i) A water right or a portion of the water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial action to declare the right 
forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years. 
(ii) If forfeiture is asserted in an action for general determination of rights in conformance with the provisions 
of Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, the 15-year limitation period shall commence to run back in time from the 
date the state engineer's proposed determination of rights is served upon each claimant. 
(iii) A decree entered in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, Determination of Water 
Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right determined to be valid in the decree, but shall 
not bar a claim for periods of nonuse that occur after the entry of the decree. 
(iv) A proposed determination by the state engineer in an action for general determination of rights under 
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right proposed 
to be valid, unless a timely objection has been filed within the time allowed in Chapter 4, Determination of Water 
Rights. 
(d) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years unless the time is further 
extended by the state engineer. 
(e) The provisions of this section are applicable whether the unused or abandoned water or a portion of the water 
is permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right with the knowledge of the water right holder, provided 
that the use of water pursuant to a lease or other agreement with the appropriator or the appropriator's successor shall be 
considered to constitute beneficial use. 
(f) The provisions of this section shall not apply: 
(i) to those periods of time when a surface water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right, 
or when groundwater is not available because of a sustained drought; 
(ii) to water stored in reservoirs pursuant to an existing water right, where the stored water is being held in 
storage for present or future use; or 
(iii) when a water user has beneficially used substantially all of a water right within a five-year period, provided 
that this exemption shall not apply to the adjudication of a water right in a general determination of water rights under 
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights. 
(g) Groundwater rights used to supplement the quantity or quality of other water supplies may not be subject to 
loss or reduction tinder this section if not used during periods when the other water source delivers sufficient water so as 
to not require use of the supplemental groundwater. 
(4) (a) The state engineer shall furnish an application requiring the following information: 
(i) the name and address of the applicant; 
(ii) a description of the water right or a portion of the water right, including the point of diversion, place of use, 
and priority; 
(iii) the date the water was last diverted and placed to beneficial use; 
(iv) the quantity of water, 
(v) the period of use; 
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(vi) the extension of time applied for, 
(vii) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water, and 
(viii) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(b) Filing the application extends the time during which nonuse may continue until the state engineer issues his 
order on the nonuse application. 
(c) (i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish a notice of the application once a week for 
two successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of the water supply is 
located and where the water is to be used. 
(ii) The notice shall: 
(A) state that an application has been made; and 
(B) specify where the interested party may obtain additional information relating to the application. 
(d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the granting of the application: 
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is informal; and 
(ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal. 
(e) In any proceedings to determine whether the application for extension should be approved or rejected, the 
state engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application. 
(5) (a) Nonuse applications on all or a portion of a water right shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not 
exceeding five years each, upon a showing of reasonable cause for nonuse. 
(b) Reasonable causes for nonuse include: 
(i) demonstrable financial hardship or economic depression; 
(ii) the initiation of recognized water conservation or efficiency practices, or the operation of a groundwater 
recharge recovery program approved by the state engineer; 
(iii) operation of legal proceedings; 
(iv) the holding of a water right or stock in a mutual water company without use by any public water supply 
entity to meet the reasonable future requirements of the public; 
(v) situations where, in the opinion of the state engineer, the nonuse would assist in implementing an existing, 
approved water management plan; 
(vi) situations where all or part of the land on which water is used is contracted under an approved state 
agreement or federal conservation fallowing program; 
(vii) the loss of capacity caused by deterioration of the water supply or delivery equipment if the applicant 
submits, with the application, a specific plan to resume full use of the water right by replacing, restoring, or improving 
the equipment; or 
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(viii) any other reasonable cause. 
(6) (a) Sixty days before the expiration of any extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by 
registered mail or by any form of electronic communication through which receipt is verifiable, of the date when the 
extension period will expire. 
(b) Before the date of expiration, the applicant shall either: 
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, 
and whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; or 
(ii) apply for a further extension of time in which to resume use of the water according to the procedures and 
requirements of this section. 
(c) Upon receipt of the applicant's properly completed, verified statement, the state engineer shall conduct 
investigations necessary to verify that beneficial use has resumed and, if so, shall issue a certificate of resumption of use 
of the water as evidenced by the resumed beneficial use. 
(7) The appropriated water right or a portion of the water right ceases and the water reverts to the public if the: 
(a) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for an extension of time; 
(b) state engineer denies the nonuse application; or 
(c) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for a further extension of time. 
HISTORY: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 6; R.S. 1933,100-1-4; L. 1935, ch. 104, § 1; 1939, ch. 111, § 1; C. 1943,100-1-4; L. 
1945, ch. 134, § 1; 1959, ch. 137, § 1; 1987, ch. 161, § 287; 1988, ch. 72, § 28; 1995, ch. 19, § 1; 1996, ch. 98, § 1; 
2001, ch. 136, § 1; 2002, ch. 20, § 1; 2003, ch. 99, § 1. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, redesignated the second sentence of 
Subsection (1Kb) as (l)(c); subdivided Subsection (2)(c); substituted "two" for "three" before "successive weeks" and 
added "and where water is to be used" in Subsection (2Xc)(i); added Subsections (2)(c)(ii), (2)(d)(i), and (2)(dXii); and 
made related and stylistic changes throughout. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,1996, in Subsection 0Xa)> substituted "water right ceases and the water 
reverts to the public" for "the right ceases"; added Subsection (l)(b), and redesignated subsequent subsections 
accordingly; redesignated former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4) and former Subsection (4) as Subsection (5); added 
Subsection (5)(a)(iii); and made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(a) added "or by any form of electronic 
communication through which receipt is verifiable," in Subsection (4)(b)(i) added "in a manner prescribed by the state 
engineer," and made stylistic changes. 
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6,2002, rewrote this section. 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5,2003, substituted "Section 17A-2-701.5" for "Section 17A-2-7" in Subsection 
(2)(a); in Subsection (4)(c)(ii), deleted "inform the public of the nature of the right for which the extension is requested 
and the reasons for the extension," and added Subsections (4)(cXii)(A) and (4)(c)(ii)(B); and made stylistic and related 
changes. 
COMPILER'S NOTES. -This section was Comp. Laws 1907, § 1288x23. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 





Appropriation after forfeiture. 
Forfeiture of rights. 
In general. 





Forfeiture of water rights by nonuse under this section does not violate Utah Const, Art. XI, § 6, because the 
constitution only prohibits the voluntary, intentional disposition of water rights, whereas a forfeiture under this section 
is involuntary. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673 (Utah 1989). 
ABANDONMENT. 
Abandonment of a water right requires an intent to abandon, coupled with some act of relinquishment by which the 
intent is carried out. Promontory Ranch Co. v. Argile, 28 Utah 398t 79 P. 47 (1904); Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 
66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
In action to determine title to waters of a spring having its source on plaintiffs1 land, fact that neither plaintiffs nor 
their grantors made any use of the water, and permitted it to continue to flow through an artificial watercourse which 
they had purchased from one having a right thereto, was not sufficient to show abandonment, so as to render the water 
subject to appropriation, especially in view of other affirmative acts of plaintiffs tending to show that they had no 
intention of abandoning their rights. Gill v. Malan, 29 Utah 431, 82 P. 471 (1905). 
Abandonment, as applied to doctrine of appropriation of water to a beneficial use, means an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P. 2d 894 (1937). 
In action to quiet title to waters of a spring, finding of court that defendants said plaintiff was stealing their water 
negated an abandonment of the water by defendants, so it could not revert to public and again be subject to 
appropriation. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
Abandonment is a separate and distinct concept from that of a forfeiture. Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d278 (1943); In re 
Drainage Area of Bear River, 12 Utah 2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961). 
The burden is on the person asserting abandonment of water rights to prove it and proof of abandonment must fail in 
absence of showing of an intent to abandon. Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 
Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d278 (1943); Smithfield W. Bench Irrigation Co. v. 
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948); Fairfield Irrigation Co. v.. Carson, 122 Utah 225, 247 
P.2d 1004 (1952); In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
Abandonment differs from the nonuse provided by this section in that abandonment requires proof of an intent to 
abandon the water right. In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Adverse possession is not founded upon or dependent on the doctrine of abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse of 
water rights. Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894 (1937). 
APPROPRIATION AFTER FORFEITURE. 
When a vested right is forfeited by nonuse, there is reversion to the public, and the right to use water so abandoned 
can only be initiated by making a new appropriation after the water is available for appropriation. Whitmore v. Welch, 
114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949). 
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FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS. 
Nonuse of appropriated waters for statutory period, as well as intentional abandonment, results in loss of rights 
thereto. Deseret Livestock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479 (1925). 
Forfeiture of a water right for nonuse during the statutory time may occur despite a specific intent not to surrender the 
right, since it is based, not upon an act done, or an intent had, but upon failure to use the right for the statutory time. 
Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66P.2d894 (1937). 
Forfeiture will not operate when the failure to use is a result of physical causes beyond the control of the appropriator, 
such as floods that destroy his dams and ditches, troughs, and the like, if the appropriator is ready and willing to divert 
the water when it is naturally available. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202,135 P.2d 
108 (citing textbooks, decisions from other western states, and federal court cases), rehearing denied, 104 Utah 216, 140 
P.2d638 (1943). 
Under this section a forfeiture is based upon the failure to use the water. Accordingly, there is no forfeiture where 
there is no showing that appropriator or his successor in interest has failed to use the water for a beneficial purpose for a 
period of five years. This principle does not, however, imply that an appropriator can, without getting the approval of 
the state engineer, change the nature of the use or the place of diversion. Nor may an appropriator who has a 
supplemental storage right, without completing construction of storage facilities in the allotted time, and without getting 
an extension of time for the completion of construction, keep his storage right alive indefinitely by making direct flow 
diversions from the river. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 216,140 P.2d 638 (1943). 
Pledgee of certificate of mutual irrigation company could not be charged with abandonment by nonuse because 
certificate was not used for a period of more than five years, where certificate was void, and, therefore, the holder 
thereof was never entitled to any water rights thereunder. Commercial Bank v. Spanish ForkS. Irrigation Co., 107 Utah 
279, 153 P.2d 547 (1944). 
Statutes fixing the maximum time limit for the nonuse of a water right, when free from ambiguity, should be strictly 
construed, and a case clearly made out before any relief should be extended to the delinquent thereunder. Baugh v. 
Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P2d 790 (1967). 
Town's leasing of its water right in violation of Utah Const, Art. XI, § 6, did not work a statutory forfeiture of the 
town's water right where the water was apparently contaminated and generally unsuitable for culinary use and the lease 
arrangement at least insured that the water was beneficially used for irrigation, with no actual loss to the town's citizens 
because the technology to render the water usable for town purposes was apparently not available during the term of the 
lease. Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). 
IN GENERAL. 
For discussion of the concepts of abandonment and forfeiture of water rights, the distinction between abandonment 
and forfeiture of water rights and loss of rights to another by prescription or adverse use, and the requirements for and 
proof of a water right by adverse use, see Wellsville E. Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 
448, 137 P.2d 634, rehearing denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 (1943); In re Drainage Area of Bear River, 12Utah 
2d1,361 P.2d407(1961). 
The development of water in this arid state requires strict adherence to statutory sanctions, without delay or 
nonconformance thereto, except in rare and highly equitable instances. Baugh v. Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 
(1967). 
PROOF OF FORFEITURE. 
Because the party asserting forfeiture did not challenge the trial court's ruling that it was required to prove forfeiture 
by clear and convincing evidence, the company accepted that burden, which it failed to meet. The reviewing court 
declined to address the issue of whether "clear and convincing" was the correct burden of proof. Butler, Crockett & 
Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, 506 Utah Adv. 17, 98 P.3d 1. 
STANDING. 
A water conservancy district lacked standing under the traditional test to bring an action under this section because its 
evidence regarding the connection between its own water use and that of the water right owner's was inconclusive. 
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Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 489 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 82 P.3d 1125. 
Water conservancy district's challenge to the state engineer's approval of a water right owner's change application and 
its forfeiture action against the water right owner did not qualify for the public importance exceptions to the traditional 
standing rule, as the district made no showing that the validity of the water right owner's right to use groundwater was 
an issue of sufficient public importance to justify departure from traditional standing requirements. Wash. County Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 489 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 82P.3dll25. 
The Utah Water Conservancy Act, § 17A-2-1401 et seq., did not confer standing on a water conservancy district to 
bring a forfeiture action against a private water right owner under this section; the broad purpose statements in § 
17A-2-1401 were insufficient to establish statutory standing to seek to overturn approved change applications or to 
press forfeiture claims in cases where the district's own uses were not affected and the district's express powers in § 
17A-2-1413 did not include the power to enforce beneficial water use through the water forfeiture statute. Wash. County 
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 489 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 82P.3dll25. 
TIME EXTENSION. 
State engineer's proposed determination in a drainage area which disallowed plaintiffs' water rights in their wells 
interrupted the running of this section against the plaintiffs and the fact that plaintiffs did not file a protest within five 
years after the effective date of the statute was not controlling since they did file within the time extended by the court. 
In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961). 
Right to use water nonconsumptively to run power mill wheel lapsed when owner failed to file engineer's form stating 
that beneficial use had been resumed within extension of time to resume granted when mill burned down, 
notwithstanding argument that resumption of use had actually occurred within extension period. Bough v. Criddle, 19 
Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 (1967). 
Party applying to state engineer for extension of time in which to resume use of water does not have to pay filing fee 
in advance. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Myers, 24 Utah 2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970). 
In action to have defendant's right to use water declared forfeited for nonuse and to enjoin any further use, trial court 
improperly granted summary judgment for plaintiff since state engineer had granted extension of time for defendant to 
resume use and plaintiff did not use proper remedy of civil action in district court for review of state engineer's decision, 
but rather filed action to have defendant's rights declared forfeited, which resulted in an attempt by plaintiff to exercise 
authority granted specifically to state engineer to enjoin unlawful diversion. Glenwood Irrigation Co. v. Myers, 24 Utah 
2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970). 
WASTE WATER. 
Portion of appropriated water allowed to run waste cannot be appropriated by another unless owner intentionally 
abandons right to its use, or fails to apply it to beneficial purpose for statutory period, and owner may reclaim exclusive 
rights to such water by applying it to beneficial use at any time before lapse of statutory period, in absence of earlier 
intentional abandonment of rights thereto. Torsakv. Rukavina, 67 Utah 166, 246 P. 367 (1926). 
Question of waste water or excess water is discussed at length in majority and concurring opinions in Smithfield W. 
Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
UTAH LAW REVIEW. -The Failure of Subdivision Control in the Western United States: A Blueprint for Local 
Government Action, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 569. 
Recent Legislative Developments in Utah Law ~ Water Forfeiture Amendments, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 790. 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND POLICY. -Legal Impediments to Interstate Water Marketing: Application to 
Utah, 9 J. Energy L. & PoVy 237 (1989). 
Nephi City v. Hansen : The Utah Supreme Court Sidesteps Public Trust Principles in Allowing Forfeiture of 
Municipal Water Rights, 11J. Energy L. & PoVy 369 (1991). 
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TREATISES. -Thomas and Backman, Utah Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), § 9.04. 
AM. JUR. 2D. -78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters §§ 240,342. 
CJ.S. -93 C.J.S. Waters § 193. 
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TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 3. APPROPRIATION 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 (2004) 
§ 73-3-3. Permanent or temporary changes in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Permanent changes" means changes for an indefinite length of time with an intent to relinquish the original 
point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use. 
(b) "Temporary changes" means changes for fixed periods not exceeding one year. 
(2) (a) Any person entitled to the use of water may make permanent or temporary changes in the: 
(i) point of diversion; 
(ii) place of use; or 
(iii) purpose of use for which the water was originally appropriated, 
(b) A change may not be made if it impairs any vested right without just compensation. 
(3) Both permanent and temporary changes of point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use of water, including 
water involved in general adjudication or other suits, shall be made in the manner provided in this section. 
(4) (a) A change may not be made unless the change application is approved by the state engineer, 
(b) Applications shall be made upon forms furnished by the state engineer and shall set forth: 
(i) the name of the applicant; 
(ii) a description of the water right; 
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(iii) the quantity of water; 
(iv) the stream or source; 
(v) the point on the stream or source where the water is diverted; 
(vi) the point to which it is proposed to change the diversion of the water; 
(vii) the place, purpose, and extent of the present use; 
(viii) the place, purpose, and extent of the proposed use; and 
(ix) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
(5) (a) The state engineer shall follow the same procedures, and the rights and duties of the applicants with respect 
to applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use shall be the same, as 
provided in this title for applications to appropriate water. 
(b) The state engineer may, in connection with applications for permanent change involving only a change in 
point of diversion of 660 feet or less, waive the necessity for publishing a notice of application. 
(6) (a) The state engineer shall investigate all temporary change applications. 
(b) If the state engineer finds that the temporary change will not impair any vested rights of others, he shall issue 
an order authorizing the change. 
(c) If the state engineer finds that the change sought might impair vested rights, before authorizing the change, he 
shall give notice of the application to any person whose rights may be affected by the change. 
(d) Before making an investigation or giving notice, the state engineer may require the applicant to deposit a sum 
of money sufficient to pay the expenses of the investigation and publication of notice. 
(7) (a) The state engineer may not reject applications for either permanent or temporary changes for the sole reason 
that the change would impair the vested rights of others. 
(b) If otherwise proper, permanent or temporary changes may be approved for part of the water involved or upon 
the condition that conflicting rights are acquired. 
(8) (a) Any person holding an approved application for the appropriation of water may either permanently or 
temporarily change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use. 
(b) A change of an approved application does not: 
(i) affect the priority of the original application; or 
(ii) extend the time period within which the construction of work is to begin or be completed. 
(9) Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, either 
permanently or temporarily, without first applying to the state engineer in the manner provided in this section: 
(a) obtains no right; and 
(b) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, each day of the unlawful change constituting a separate offense, separately 
punishable. 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3 
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(10) (a) This section does not apply to the replacement of an existing well by a new well drilled within a radius of 
150 feet from the point of diversion of the existing well. 
(b) Any replacement well must be drilled in accordance with the requirements of Section 73-3-28. 
(11) (a) In accordance witrrthe requirements of this section, the Division of Wildlife Resources or Division of 
Parks and Recreation may file applications for permanent or temporary changes for the purpose of providing water for 
instream flows, within a designated section of a natural stream channel or altered natural stream channel, necessary 
within the state of Utah for: 
(i) the propagation offish; 
(ii) public recreation; or 
(iii) the reasonable preservation or enhancement of the natural stream environment. 
(b) Applications may be filed for changes on: 
(i) perfected water rights presently owned by the respective division; 
(ii) perfected water rights purchased by the respective division for the purpose of providing water for instream 
flows, through funding provided for that purpose by legislative appropriation or acquired by lease, agreement, gift, 
exchange, or contribution; or 
(iii) appurtenant water rights acquired with the acquisition of real property by either division. 
(c) A physical structure or physical diversion from the stream is not required to implement a change for instream 
flow use. 
(d) Subsection (11) does not allow enlargement of the water right sought to be changed nor may the change 
impair any vested water right. 
(e) In addition to the other requirements of this section, an application filed by either division shall: 
(i) set forth the legal description of the points on the stream between which the necessary instream flows will be 
provided by the change; and 
(ii) include appropriate studies, reports, or other information required by the state engineer that demonstrate the 
necessity for the instream flows in the specified section of the stream and the projected benefits to the public that will 
result from the change. 
(f) The Division of Wildlife Resources and Division of Parks and Recreation may: 
(i) purchase water rights for the purposes provided in Subsection (1 l)(a) only with funds specifically 
appropriated by the Legislature for water rights purchases; or 
(ii) accept a donated water right without legislative approval. 
(g) Subsection (11) does not authorize either division to: 
(i) appropriate unappropriated water under Section 73-3-2 for the purpose of providing instream flows; or 
(ii) acquire water rights by eminent domain for instream flows or for any other purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3 
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(h) Subsection (11) applies only to change applications filed on or after April 28,1986. 
(12) (a) Sixty days before the date on which proof of change for instream flows under Subsection (11) is due, the 
state engineer shall notify the applicant by registered mail or by any form of electronic communication through which 
receipt is verifiable of the date when proof of change is due. 
(b) Before the date when proof of change is due, the applicant must either 
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer that the instream flow uses have been perfected, which shall 
set forth: 
(A) the legal description of the points on the natural stream channel or altered natural stream channel between 
which the necessary instream flows have been provided; 
(B) detailed measurements of the flow of water in second feet changed; 
(C) the period of use; and 
(D) any additional information required by the state engineer; or 
(ii) apply for a further extension of time as provided for in Section 73-3-12. 
(c) Upon approval of the verified statement required under Subsection (12)(b)(i), the state engineer shall issue a 
certificate of change for instream flow use. 
HISTORY: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 8; R.S. 1933,100-3-3; L. 1937, ch. 130, § 1; 1939, ch. I l l , § 1; C. 1943,100-3-3; L. 
1949, ch. 97, § 1; 1959, ch. 137, § 1; 1986, ch. 40, § 1; 1987, ch. 161, § 289; 1992, ch. 208, § 1; 2001, ch. 136, § 3. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2001 amendment, effective April 30,2001, added "or by any form of 
electronic communication through which receipt is verifiable" in Subsection (12)(a). 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Division of Wildlife Resources, § 23-14-1 et seq. 
Fees of state engineer, § 73-2-14. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adjudication of rights. 
Assigning application for appropriation. 
Burden of proof. 
Change in place of diversion. 
Change in use. 
Conditions imposed to protect vested rights. 
Consequences of noncompliance. 
Decisions of engineer. 
— Aggrieved persons. 
Enforcement. 
Necessity of application for change. 
Notice by engineer. 
Partial approval of changes. 
Powers and duties of state engineer. 
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Public policy. 
Right of appropriator to make changes. 
Vested rights. 
— Impairment 
Waiver of impairment claim. 
Cited. 
ADJUDICATION OF RIGHTS. 
The statute leaves the adjudication of the rights that the applicant may have or may acquire under the application, and 
the rights of the protestants, to the courts in a different proceeding, and not to the engineer who is merely an executive 
officer. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952). 
The engineer does not adjudicate the rights of the protestants or the applicant to the use of the waters in question, nor 
the rights the applicant may obtain under the application. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 
(1952). 
Ownership of shares in a nonprofit mutual water corporation did not confer a right to "the use of the water" as 
contemplated by Subsection (2). Any change in point of diversion could have been initiated only by the corporation 
itself, since it alone owned the right as an appropriator to the use of public waters. East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. 
Morgan, 860P.2d310 (Utah 1993). 
ASSIGNING APPLICATION FOR APPROPRIATION. 
Where prior assignment of application to appropriate unappropriated public water was valid and entitled to preference 
over subsequent assignment, neither state engineer nor court could approve subsequent assignee's application for change 
in diversion point and place of use of water to be appropriated under application, since he did not own application to 
appropriate. McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948). 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
In action to change point of diversion of water from a river to tributaries upon which power company's dam was 
located, burden of proving a prima facie case rested on plaintiff. Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484 
(1935). 
In an action for a change of use as to already appropriated direct flow irrigation water, from an early season use, to 
storage in a proposed dam for later use in irrigating more valuable later season crops, the plaintiff has the duty to prove 
that vested rights will not be impaired by approval of his application; but such duty must not be made unreasonably 
onerous to the point where every remote but presently indeterminable vested right must be pinpointed. American Fork 
Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239P.2dl88 (1951). 
If the evidence shows that there is reason to believe that the proposed change can be made without impairing vested 
rights the application should be approved. A change application cannot be rejected without a showing that vested rights 
will thereby be substantially impaired. While the applicant has the general burden of showing that no impairment of 
vested rights will result from the change, the person opposing such an application must fail if the evidence does not 
disclose that his rights will be impaired. Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users' Ass % 2 Utah 2d 141, 270 
P.2d 453 (1954). 
The applicant must show reason to believe that the proposed change in direct flow water rights to storage can be made 
without impairing vested rights, and, if vested rights will be impaired by the change, the application should not be 
approved. Piute Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 13 Utah 2d 6, 367 P.2d 855 
(1962). 
CHANGE IN PLACE OF DIVERSION. 
Where corporation distributed water to its shareholders by means of ditches, transfer of water to shareholders from 
one ditch to another was not a change of place of diversion. Arnold v. Huntington Canal & Reservoir Ass'n, 64 Utah 
534, 231 P. 622 (1924). 
A shareholder in a mutual water corporation had no right to file to change the place of diversion in its own name 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3 
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without the consent of the corporation under the statutory scheme governing the appropriation of public waters, the 
principles of corporate law allowing boards of directors to manage corporate affairs in the interest of shareholders as a 
whole, or public policy. East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993). 
CHANGE IN USE. 
Where the appropriator of water for irrigation uses the water without waste, and in accordance with his appropriation, 
no one can complain, and no court can change his manner of using the water. Nephi Irrigation Co, v. Vickers, 29 Utah 
315, 81 P. 144(1905). 
CONDITIONS IMPOSED TO PROTECT VESTED RIGHTS. 
In action to change point of diversion of water from a river to tributaries upon which power company's dam was 
located, if exchange of waters could be made without affecting vested right of power company or if decree could be 
entered with conditions that would safeguard rights of power company, plaintiff should succeed. Tanner v. Humphreys, 
87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484 (1935). 
CONSEQUENCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE. 
The failure of a city to file a change application merely subjects it to this section's enforcement provision and can not 
alone deprive it of rights to waters to which it is otherwise entitled. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 
UT3, 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. 
DECISIONS OF ENGINEER. 
In granting an application, the engineer does not determine that the applicant's rights are prior to the rights of the 
protestant; he only finds that there is reason to believe that some water may be beneficially used thereunder without 
interfering with the rights of others. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951). 
The decision of the engineer is administrative in nature and purpose. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 
P.2d 1132 (1951), 
The engineer's findings and decision are limited to the authority delegated by law to his office. American Fork 
Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P2d 188 (1951). 
Although the findings and decisions of the engineer, administrative in nature, merit studied consideration and great 
weight, nevertheless the judiciary is the sole ultimate arbiter of law and fact in water cases, bound neither by the nature, 
extent or content of his decision, nor as to the character, quantum or quality of proof, evidence or data adduced at 
hearings before him or accumulated independently by his office. American Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 
239 P.2d 188 (1951). 
It is the state engineer's obligation, before approving a change application, to determine that no vested water right will 
be impaired by the proposed change. Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983). 
The state engineer is required to undertake the same investigation in permanent change applications that the statute 
mandates in applications for water appropriations. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
The state engineer must investigate and reject an application for either appropriation or permanent change of use or 
place of use if approval would interfere with more beneficial use, public recreation, the natural stream environment, or 
the public welfare. Bonham v, Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
~ AGGRIEVED PERSONS. 
Plaintiffs, who alleged that the state engineer failed to conduct an investigation as required by § 73-3-8 to determine 
what damage a change application would have on private and public property, and failed to comply with this section by 
not considering the "duties" of the applicants, were "aggrieved persons" within the meaning of § 73-3-14. Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
ENFORCEMENT. 
This section provides its own enforcement clause, and nowhere in the statutes does it appear that unauthorized change 
in the place of diversion or in the nature of the use shall constitute a forfeiture of the water. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3 
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Rents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638 (1943). 
NECESSITY OF APPLICATION FOR CHANGE. 
An application is necessary in order to perfect a right to change the use of water from use for mining purposes to use 
for domestic and irrigation purposes. Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson, 122 Utah 225, 247 P.2d 1004 (1952). 
NOTICE BY ENGINEER. 
Since any action by state engineer in granting application for change of diversion, use or place cannot affect any 
vested right, it follows that notice by publication, instead of personal service of notice of such application, does not 
violate the due process clause of state Constitution. Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445,154 P. 2d 748 (1944). 
PARTIAL APPROVAL OF CHANGES. 
In action to change point of diversion of water from a river to tributaries upon which power company's dam was 
located and to change use from an irrigation to a domestic or municipal purpose, court erred in nonsuiting plaintiff on 
ground that plaintiffs use would be enlarged, since decree could prevent such enlargement Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 
Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484 (1935). 
If there is reason to believe that only a part of the waters covered by the application may be diverted at the proposed 
new diversion place without interfering with the rights of others, the state engineer in the first place and the court on 
appeal should approve the application to change the diversion place of only such amount of water as there is reason to 
believe may be changed without impairing the rights of others, regardless of the amount specified in the application. 
United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952). 
POWERS AND DUTIES OF STATE ENGINEER. 
Although the engineer is required, as are courts, to exercise discretion, determine facts after a hearing, and approve or 
reject applications accordingly, his duties are administrative in nature and purpose. United States v. District Court, 121 
Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951). 
PUBLIC POLICY. 
As long as vested rights are not impaired by its completion, a plan for the more beneficial use of water contemplates a 
most desirable result fully consistent with progress and change, and reflecting the established policy of this state. 
American Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 (1951). 
The legislature invested the engineer with important but not conclusive discretionary powers and duties deserving of 
great respect, but as a safeguard against possible injustice, and by plenary review on trial de novo, it also invested the 
court with the ultima ratio and final say as to conflicting contentions of applicant and protestant. American Fork 
Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 (1951). 
RIGHT OF APPROPRIATOR TO MAKE CHANGES. 
Prior appropriator's right to change the place of diversion is not absolute or vested right, but is only conditional, since 
no such change can be made if public, or any other appropriator, prior or subsequent, is adversely affected, and neither 
can a prior appropriator prevent a subsequent appropriator from using any of the unappropriated waters of the state to 
the fullest extent possible merely because prior appropriator in future may desire to change his place of diversion. 
United States v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 2$1 P. 434 (1924); Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 
(1947). 
Prior appropriator could make changes in place of diversion and in use of water that neither enlarged nor diminished 
any existing right but merely made use of existing right at another place, without detriment or impairment of any vested 
right of junior appropriator. Lehmitz v. Utah Copper Co., 118 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1941). 
In determining damages recoverable for diversion of water, the fact that ranch owners had used the water for irrigation 
purposes does not limit the value of the water to them since this section provides that upon application an appropriator 
may change the use of his water. Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278,142 P.2d 154 (1943). 
Although this section clearly indicates that one has right to improve his method of taking his entitlement of water, 
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3 
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other factors must be taken into account in authorizing change in order to implement "beneficial use" policy of state. 
Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2d97t 458 P.2d861 (1969). 
VESTED RIGHTS. 
The owner of a water right has a vested right to the quality as well as the quantity that he has beneficially used. Salt 
Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 2 Utah 2d 141, 270 P.2d 453 (1954). 
A lower user of water of a natural stream acquires a vested right as against all upper users that they shall not increase 
the amount of water consumed after he makes his appropriation by a change of place of diversion or place or manner of 
use and thereby deprive him of the use of such water. East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 
170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954); Piute Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 13 Utah 2d 
6,367 P.2d'855 (1962). 
When a reservoir is constructed, the amount of water that lower users are entitled to is what they had a right to under 
the old system, and an application by the reservoir operators for a change in the diversion and use of water should be 
granted when it does not affect the vested rights of other users. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 5 Utah 2d 
53, 296 P.2d 723 (1956). 
- IMPAIRMENT. 
A change in the place of diversion or the place or nature of use or a combination of such changes cannot be made if 
the lower users, whether prior or subsequent to the rights of the parties making the change, will thereby be deprived of 
the use of water which they would have had under the use which the upper appropriators made before the change. Such 
a change would enlarge the rights of the upper appropriators and impair the vested rights of the lower users because 
their rights were established on the basis that no such enlargement or changes of use would be made after the lower 
users had perfected their appropriation and this is true of storage as well as direct flow waters. East Bench Irrigation 
Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954). 
WAIVER OF IMPAIRMENT CLAIM. 
In a protest hearing involving an application for a change in diversion point, private well owners waived claims of 
impairment to their rights when they failed to make known the nature of those rights. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 
966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998). 
CITED in Estate of Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1992); Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 
922 P.2d 745 (Utah 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
UTAH LAW REVIEW. -Recent Developments in Utah Law - Legislative Enactments -Water Law, 1987 Utah L. 
Rev. 322. 
The Failure of Subdivision Control in the Western United States: A Blueprint for Local Government Action, 1988 
Utah L. Rev. 569. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Water Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 195. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions - Water Law, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. -Note, Bonham v. Morgan: 
Utah's "New" Criteria for Water Right Change Applications, 11 J. Energy, Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 143 (1990). 
The Upstream Battle in the Protection of Utah's Instream Flows, 14 J. Energy, Nat. Resources, & Envtl. L. 113 
(1994). 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND POLICY. -A Primer of Utah Water Law, 5 J. Energy L. & Poly 165 (1984). 
A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II, 6 J. Energy L. & Poly 1 (1985). 
Water Planning: Untapped Opportunity for the Western States, 9 J. Energy L. & Poly 1 (1988). 
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AM. JUR. 2D. -78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters §§ 3329 336. 
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TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION 
CHAPTER 3. APPROPRIATION 
Utah Code Ann, § 73-3-8 (2004) 
§ 73-3-8. Approval or rejection of application — Requirements for approval — Application for specified period of time 
— Filing of royalty contract for removal of salt or minerals 
(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve an application if: (a) there is unappropriated water in the 
proposed source; (b) the proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the more beneficial use of the 
water; (c) the proposed plan is physically and economically feasible, unless the application is filed by the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation, and would not prove detrimental to the public welfare; (d) the applicant has the financial ability 
to complete the proposed works; and (e) the application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of speculation or 
monopoly. If the state engineer, because of information in his possession obtained either by his own investigation or 
otherwise, has reason to believe that an application to appropriate water will interfere with its more beneficial use for 
irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining development or manufacturing, or will unreasonably 
affect public recreation or the natural stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it is his duty 
to withhold his approval or rejection of the application until he has investigated the matter. If an application does not 
meet the requirements of this section, it shall be rejected. 
(2) An application to appropriate water for industrial, power, mining development, manufacturing purposes, 
agriculture, or municipal purposes may be approved for a specific and certain period from the time the water is placed to 
beneficial use under the application, but in no event may an application be granted for a period of time less than that 
ordinarily needed to satisfy the essential and primary purpose of the application or until the water is no longer available 
as determined by the state engineer. At the expiration of the period fixed by the state engineer the water shall revert to 
the public and is subject to appropriation as provided by Title 73. The state engineer may extend any limited water right 
upon a showing that the essential purpose of the original application has not been satisfied, that the need for an 
extension is not the result of any default or neglect by the applicant, and that water is still available; except no extension 
shall exceed the time necessary to satisfy the primary purpose of the original application. A request for extension must 
be filed in writing in the office of the state engineer not later than 60 days before the expiration date of the application. 
(3) Before the approval of any application for the appropriations of water from navigable lakes or streams of the 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 
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state which contemplates the recovery of salts and other minerals therefrom by precipitation or otherwise, the applicant 
shall file with the state engineer a copy of a contract for the payment of royalties to the state of Utah. The approval of an 
application shall be revoked in the event of the failure of the applicant to comply with terms of his royalty contract 
HISTORY: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 48; R.S. 1933,100-3-8; L. 1939, ch. 111, § 1; 1941, ch. 96, § 1; C. 1943,100-3-8; L. 
1959, ch. 137, § 1; 1971, ch. 187, § 1; 1976, ch. 32, § 1; 1985, ch. 139, § 1. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1985 amendment added the subsection designations (1) through (3); in 
Subsection (1), redesignated the internal subsections (1) through (4) as (a) through (d) and added the designation (e); 
substituted "If for "provided, that where" at the beginning of the second sentence of Subsection (1); inserted 
"agriculture, or municipal purposes" near the beginning of Subsection (2); substituted "may" for "shall" in the middle of 
the first sentence of Subsection (2); inserted "or until the water is no longer available" near the end of the first sentence 
of Subsection (2); inserted "and that water is still available" in the third sentence of Subsection (2); divided Subsection 
(3) into two sentences, substituting "The approval" for "provided that approval" at the beginning of the second sentence; 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Fees of state engineer, § 73-2-14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Object of state engineer's office under this section is to maintain order and efficiency in appropriation, distribution and 
conservation of water and to allow as much water to be beneficially used as possible. Bullock v. Hanks, 22 Utah 2d 308, 
452 P.2d 866 (1969). 
ANALYSIS 
Basis for approval of application. 
Burden of proof. 
Contracts. 
Determination by engineer. 
Duty of state engineer. 
-- Aggrieved persons. 
Effect of approval. 
Existing rights impaired. 
In general. 




Mutual water and irrigation corporations. 
Necessity for approval of application. 
Proceeding to change diversion or use. 
Public welfare affected. 
Rehearings. 
Review of engineer's decision. 
Speculation. 
Unappropriated water in source. 
BASIS FOR APPROVAL OF APPLICATION. 
Under former statute, applicant to state engineer for appropriation of certain unappropriated waters of stream was 
entitled, as matter of right, to have his application approved and allowed if unappropriated water existed. Brady v. 
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McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 188 (1921). 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
When application to appropriate water is up for approval or rejection, applicant is not required to prove to state 
engineer that he can make an appropriation by the same kind and quantum of proof that would be required were he 
making final proof under § 73-3-16. Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77P.2d362 (1938). 
In determining whether application to appropriate water should be approved or rejected, general negative by applicant 
as to injury to protestant would be sufficient to require protestant to prove that he would be injured. Eardley v. Terry, 94 
Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362 (1938). 
CONTRACTS. 
Agreement between water users was interpreted so as not to impose unreasonable restraints in conflict with the 
beneficial use doctrine. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT50, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 84 P.3d 1134. 
DETERMINATION BY ENGINEER. 
When application to appropriate water is filed, state engineer is called upon to determine preliminarily whether there 
is probable cause to believe that an application can be perfected, having due regard to whether there is unappropriated 
water available for appropriation, whether it can be put to beneficial use, and whether it can be diverted and so used 
without injuring or conflicting with prior rights of others, which if determined, application is approved, and applicant 
proceeds to demonstrate by actual use of rights sought to be acquired that he is entitled to such rights. Eardley v. Terry, 
94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362 (1938); Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943); Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. 
Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108 (1943); Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d954 
(1949). 
The engineer in making a decision under this section exercises an executive function. He determines whether there is 
reason to believe from the evidence that there are unappropriated waters in the proposed source which can be 
appropriated to a beneficial use without impairing existing rights or interfering with a more beneficial use and whether 
the proposed plan is feasible and within the financial ability of the applicant. The court's decision on appeal has only the 
effect of authorizing or denying the applicant the right to proceed with this plan to appropriate the water the same as 
though it were made by the engineer without an appeal. It is not an action to adjudicate the rights of the parties to the 
use of the water. Bullock v. Tracy, 4 Utah 2d 370, 294 P.2d 707 (1956). 
DUTY OF STATE ENGINEER. 
The state engineer is required to undertake the same investigation in permanent change applications that the statute 
mandates in applications for water appropriations. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
- AGGRIEVED PERSONS. 
Plaintiffs, who alleged that the state engineer failed to conduct an investigation as required by this section to 
determine what damage a change application would have on private and public property, and failed to comply with § 
73-3-3 by not considering the "duties" of the applicants, were "aggrieved persons" within the meaning of § 73-3-14. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
EFFECT OF APPROVAL. 
The approval of an application to appropriate is only a preliminary step. It confers upon the applicant no perfected 
right to use the water. It does not in any degree impair or diminish the existing rights of others. It merely clothes the 
applicant with authority to proceed and perfect, if he can, his proposed appropriation by the actual diversion and 
application of the water claimed to a beneficial use. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116 
(1930); Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 (1943). 
Any application to appropriate water is subject to all rights accrued prior to filing, and filing application does not give 
applicant right or license to proceed to the injury of prior rights. Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362 (1938). 
The state engineer in approving or denying an application for appropriation of water rights acts in an administrative 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 
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capacity only, and has no authority to determine rights of parties. The same reasoning applies to the extent of the state 
engineer's authority when he determines to grant or deny an application for change of diversion, use or place. Whitmore 
v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445,154 P.2d 748 (1944); United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951). 
EXISTING RIGHTS IMPAIRED. 
The determination of existing rights, in many cases, involves intricate and difficult questions of both law and fact, and 
is peculiarly a judicial function. It cannot, therefore, be said that the legislature intended, by this section, to vest the 
power to make such adjudication in the state engineer. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 
116(1930). 
Unless it appears that the approval of the application will injure vested rights of prior appropriators, the application to 
appropriate should be approved. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 
(1943); Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d954 (1949). 
IN GENERAL. 
The history of this section is recited in Tannery. Bacon, 103 Utah 494,136 P.2d 957 (1943). 
INTERFERENCE WITH MORE BENEFICIAL USE. 
This section does not provide that one of the uses mentioned is a more beneficial use than any other use mentioned. It 
does not indicate that the uses mentioned first are more beneficial than those mentioned later. It refers to each use 
mentioned as the more beneficial use, thus indicating that such use under certain circumstances may be a more 
beneficial use, and limiting the possible more beneficial uses to those mentioned. It mentions almost all possible 
beneficial uses, thus indicating that under certain circumstances one of the mentioned uses might be more beneficial 
than another, and not limiting the uses which are not more beneficial to uses other than those mentioned. Evidently the 
legislature intended that upon the filing of an application to appropriate water the state engineer should determine from 
the facts and circumstances of each case whether the approval thereof would interfere with the more beneficial use of 
the water, for one of the purposes mentioned, whether the purpose proposed in the application was for one of the 
purposes mentioned or for some other purpose. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494,136 P.2d957 (1943). 
LIMITATIONS. 
State engineer may approve applications subject to limitations. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943). 
Where application for appropriation for power purposes provided for return of the water to the stream at a point below 
the intake point of a lower prior appropriator, where there was no reasonable probability that water above such intake 
point was open to appropriation absent abandonment of the prior appropriation, where there was no allegation of such 
an abandonment, and where application was granted with condition that water be returned at or above such intake point, 
it was improper to limit such condition "unless and until it is determined by a competent tribunal that the rights o f the 
prior appropriator"have been lost by reason of nonuse." Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949). 
MINERAL ROYALTIES. 
As the state is the owner of the salt contained in the waters of Great Salt Lake, the 1941 amendment to this section is 
not unconstitutional, because it takes no right which could have been acquired by the filing of an application for the 
appropriation of water before its enactment, but merely provides a method by which rights to the salt may be acquired 
from the state land board, and thus puts one in a position to put the water to a beneficial use, and also provides a check 
with the state engineer, so that no water may be appropriated from navigable bodies of water, the beds of which belong 
to the state, for the sole purpose of taking therefrom the minerals which do not belong to the appropriator. Deseret 
Livestock Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239, 171 P.2d401 (1946). 
MONOPOLY. 
Where application covered a relatively small segment of a stream and there was no evidence that it was for 
substantially more water than essential to the capacity of the contemplated power plant, the application was not 
designed to monopolize the water of the stream. Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d954 (1949). 
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MUTUAL WATER AND IRRIGATION CORPORATIONS. 
In the context of mutual water or irrigation corporations, "existing rights," as that term is used in this section, refers to 
the right held by the corporation representing its shareholders as a body; therefore, the statutory authority of the state 
engineer does not extend to the resolution of disputes between shareholders and their corporations regarding the 
distribution of their shares. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745 (Utah 1996). 
NECESSITY FOR APPROVAL OF APPLICATION. 
Unless his application has been approved, applicant is without interest in the subject matter, and unable to prosecute 
his claim or to question prior claims. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116 (1930). 
No vested right to use of water is acquired by mere filing of application to appropriate water unless approved either by 
state engineer or by court on appeal therefrom. McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d288 (1948); Whitmore 
v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d954 (1949). 
PROCEEDING TO CHANGE DIVERSION OR USE. 
In action to change point of diversion of water from a river to tributaries upon which power company's dam was 
located and to change use from an irrigation to a domestic or municipal purpose, court erred in nonsuiting plaintiff on 
ground that plaintiffs use would be enlarged, since decree could prevent such enlargement Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 
Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484 (1935), applying this section prior to the 1939 amendment 
In granting applicant right to change its point of diversion and return, state engineer did not adjudicate the priority to 
the use of water at that point of diversion, but merely determined that applicant could use the water at that point as long 
as it did not interfere with the prior rights of others. The determination of the priority of rights is a judicial function and 
not among the powers of the state engineer. Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748 (1944). 
PUBLIC WELFARE AFFECTED. 
Under this section, where the approval of the application would prove detrimental to the public welfare, the state 
engineer is directed to reject the same. In other words, the state may reject or limit applications to appropriate its 
unappropriated waters, and state engineer may reject or limit priority of plaintiff s application in the interest of the 
public welfare. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943), citing many cases from other states. 
The decisions in Nebraska and Oregon holding that anything not for the best interest of the public would be 
"detrimental to the public welfare" within the meaning of those words as used in this section have been followed in this 
state in Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136P.2d957 (1943). 
REHEARINGS. 
State engineer has authority to grant a rehearing of his decision to grant an application for appropriation of water 
rights. Clark v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 914 (Utah 1981). 
REVIEW OF ENGINEER'S DECISION. 
A landowner was not entitled to mandamus to compel state engineer to grant the right to perfect the irrigation ditch of 
a third person, so as to avoid waste of water by seepage and to permit the landowner to use the water saved. Tanner v. 
Beers, 49 Utah 536, 165 P. 465 (1917), applying Comp. Laws 1907, § 1288x10. 
This state follows the California rule that where the state engineer does not act arbitrarily or capriciously his action 
must be upheld. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943). 
"The state engineer may not arbitrarily reject one application and approve another one for the same thing, even though 
the latter is not protested." Of course, however, plaintiff cannot complain where district court directs state engineer to 
approve plaintiffs application without making it subject to another and subsequent application to appropriate waters of 
same river, where diversion point in both applications was approximately the same, and application was not protested 
and was approved by state engineer. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943). 
In a review of a decision of the state engineer, the court may try all pertinent issues to determine whether the applicant 
has met its burden of showing that the necessary conditions exist to warrant approval of his application to appropriate 
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water, and the district court review is not limited to the particular issues as determined by the state engineer. Shields v. 
Dry Creek Irrigation Co., 12 Utah 2d98, 363 P.2d82 (1961). 
The proceeding to review a decision of the state engineer rejecting an application to appropriate water is equitable in 
nature and, where there was a finding that the applicant failed to show a feasible plan for the diversion of water, the 
finding could be reversed only if the evidence clearly preponderated against it. Shields v. Dry Creek Irrigation Co., 12 
Utah 2d 98, 363 P.2d 82 (1961). 
The Supreme Court will affirm the trial court's approval of an application to appropriate waters if, from the evidence, 
the court finds probable cause to believe that there are unappropriated waters available for appropriation and that the 
applicants can make the appropriation without interfering with prior rights to the use of the water by others. Reimann v. 
Richards, 12 Utah 2d 109, 363 P.2d499 (1961). 
SPECULATION. 
Where applicant testified without contradiction that he intended no profit for himself and where he sold his rights for 
practically what he spent apparently receiving nothing for his own efforts and time, the application could not be 
considered made for speculative purposes. Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949). 
A land sale contract providing that water rights acquired by the buyer or his assignee be considered appurtenant to the 
land and that title to such rights pass to the seller on default did not constitute speculation in water rights by the seller. 
Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d840 (1949). 
Speculation in the public waters of this state is against the best interests of its people. Although the legislature has 
given formal expression to this principle, the principle would be equally true in the absence of statute. Frailey v. 
McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d840 (1949). 
UNAPPROPRIATED WATER IN SOURCE. 
In a doubtful case the application should be approved, since the policy of the law is to prevent waste and promote the 
largest beneficial use of water. Therefore new appropriations should be favored and not hindered. If it is apparent from 
the findings that there is a substantial quantity of unappropriated water in the source, it is erroneous to deny application. 
Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116 (1930); Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake 
Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108 (1943); Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949). 
Under this section it is not a prerequisite to the approval of an application that the state engineer find affirmatively 
that there is unappropriated water in the proposed source. Stated negatively, it is only when there is no unappropriated 
water in the source that the application is to be rejected. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 
116(1930). 
Where claim of abandonment is advanced, state engineer should approve application for appropriation, since question 
whether there is unappropriated water in proposed source depends upon determination in proper proceeding of fact of 
legal abandonment, and approval of application would be condition precedent to subsequent claimant asserting right to 
water involved. Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d954 (1949). 
If there is unappropriated water in proposed source, or if it is not clear that there is no unappropriated water in 
proposed source, then state engineer should approve application, provided applicant satisfies other requirements of this 
section. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P.2d892 (1949). 
Applications should be approved if the evidence shows reasonable grounds to believe that unappropriated waters may 
be appropriated under the application. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 258 P.2d 440 (1953). 
Where the applicant seeks to appropriate underground waters which are part of the source of a surface stream, which 
surface stream is already appropriated and there is evidence giving reasonable grounds to believe that unappropriated 
waters may be appropriated under the application, the application should be granted It is not necessary that the 
applicant show that a new source of water has been found, but only that additional water can be beneficially used 
without interfering with prior rights. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 258 P.2d 440 (1953). 
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APPLICATIOiN FOR PERMANENT CHANGE 
OF WATER 
STATE OF UTAH 
Rec. by. 
Fee Paid $125^)0 
R e c r i p t # & H ! = t e W 4 
For the purpose of obtaining permission to make a permanent change of water in Jhe State of Utah, application is hereby made to the State 
Engineer, based upon the following showing of facts, suJSKgSQ JtTfc«mfe»cy|fitffihe requirements of Section 73-3-3 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. i l C O bZ I V L ? L / 
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER: W A T E R R I G H T S WATER RIGHT NUMBER: 55-11041 
(C2183NJANK0) 
k**k*'kk*kkk**k*k-k-k-krkirk*kk^*kk*kkkkkkkick*irk-k*- J R ^ ^ kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk-kkkkkkkkkkkkAkkAkkkkkkkkkk 
This Change Application proposes to change the POINT(S) OF DIVERSION and PLACE OF USE. 
AAAAAAA*"*AAAAAAAAAAAAA-*A*-*****AA*^^^ 
1. OWNERSHIP INFORMATION. 
A. NAME: Marilyn Hamblin 
ADDRESS: 2242 North 390 East 
Provo UT 84604 
NAME: GCII Investments 
ADDRESS: 242 S 200 E 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
REMARKS: INTERESTED PARTY 
NAME: Highland City Corporation 
ADDRESS: 5378 W 10400 N 
Highland. UT 84058 
REMARKS: INTERESTED PARTY 
NAME: Highland Water Company 
ADDRESS: 5378 W 10400 N 
Highland, UT 84058 
REMARKS: INTERESTED PARTY 
B. PRIORITY. OF CHANGE: 




* DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT WATER RIGHT: * 
SOURCE INFORMATION. 
A. QUANTITY OF WATER: 0.6 cfs 
B. SOURCE: Spring Creek and Provo River 
C. POINT(S) OF DIVERSION. 
COUNTY: Utah 
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER: for Water Right: 55-l±o41 (C2183NJANK0) Page: 2 
3. WATER USE INFORMATION. 
# IRRIGATION: from Apr 1 to Oct 31. IRRIGATING: 30.0000 acres. 
^ 
4. PLACE OF USE. 
* 
* THE FOLLOWING CHANGES ARE PROPOSED? * 
^ 
5. SOURCE INFORMATION. 
A. QUANTITY OF WATER: 120.0 acre-feet 
B. SOURCE: Underground Wells (9 ) (Ex is t ing ) COUNTY: Utah 
C. POINT(S) OF DIVERSION. Changed as Follows: 
POINTS OF DIVERSION -- UNDERGROUND: 
( 1 )
 um 7 n?AM™ i * ° leet frm N* c o r n e r ' S e c t i o n 23- T 4S- R IE . SLBM WELL DIAMETER: 16 inches WELL DEPTH- i nn tA i nnn -Foot 
( 2 )
 SR I D ^ l r / i , 6 0 0 HfeGt fPOm S* C O r n e r ' Section 2 5 D T 4 S . ° ° l ° k K ° * * 
m m S R : 1 6 1Xc5es«. , WELL DEPTH: 598 feet 
* UPli n r U ™ ,« ° leet frm Hli c o r n e r - S e c t i o n 26- T 4S. R IE SLBM WELL DIAMETER: 16 inches WELL DEPTH- inn tA i nnn - f w 
<4> SJiAlUf?^ U 5 0 0 ? e t frm NE C O r n e r- Section 3 4 D T 4 S . R°°1 ° SLBM° * * " WELL DIAMETER: 16 inches WELL DEPTH- inn tA I nnn ***+ 
( 5 )
 ^}{6lll%lE ,* 5 8 leet f r o m S* c o ™ e r - Section 3 5 D T 4 S . R °1E SLBM ^ WELL DIAMETER: 16 inches WELL DEPTH- ?nn tA inn * « * • 
< 6 )
 L ^ l ^ l 1 , f i 3 1 0 , f e e t f ™ * c o r n e r - Section 3 6 D T 4 S . f j 0 SLBM° * " * WELL DIAMETER: 16 inches WELL DEPTH- Hll f i o t 
< ? )
 W F H 1 m i ^ p E Ik™ Kf6et frm m C O r n e r ' S e c t 1 0 n tt-TS. R IE SLBM 
WELL DIAMETER: 16 inches WELL DEPTH- ?nn tA inn fQ*+ ( 8 ) HJ(AZlnlE J°° l et frm S* c o r n e r - Section 02 T 5 S . R0°1E° SLBM * * WELL DIAMETER: 16 inches WELL DEPTH- ?nn tA Znn *aa+ 
( 9 )
 WF.I D T A M I T V , n 1 9 ° , f 6 e t fPOm NE C O r n e r ' Section 03DET™5S. R° ° l ° SLBM° * * WELL DIAMETER: 20 inches WELL DEPTH: 585 f e e t 
D. COMMON DESCRIPTION: In Highland C i t y . UT Cty 
6. WATER USE INFORMATION. Same as HERETOFORE. 
1 1 Ov) 
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBEI for Water Right: 55 (C2183NJANK0) Page: 3 
7. PLACE OF USE. Changed as Follows: 
(Which includes a l l or par t o f the fol lowing l e g a l subdiv is ions: ) 
BASE TOWN RANG SEC 





1 NORTH-WEST^ RDRTTT-EAST^ SOUTH-WEST!* SOUTH-EAST^ 
NW NE SW SE NW NE SW SE NW NE SW SE NW NE SW SEj 
"X 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
Tctrk 






* * * 




6CII Investments. Highland Water Company and Highland City Corporation have an 
agreement under which the water from water right 55-11041 will be diverted 
from the identified wells and used for irrigation on lands owned by GCII 
Investments. 
9. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT(S). 
The undersigned hereby acknowledges that even though he/she/they may have been assisted 
in the preparation of the above-numbered application, through the courtesy of the 
employees of the Division of Water Rights, all responsibility for the accuracy of the 




Highland uty Corporation 
/r^^ta^^f 
1 
Section 26, Township 4 South, Range 1 East 
A-
'A 
"-' - i g i t T h i s Map In Support Of 
:
" ^ n **-'/<> YI L - As A Tr < ^ 
-presentation Of My Knowledge And Belief. 
(Print Name). 
A 
3 ) _ 
Title: Date: 08-12-2004 
Scale: 1 inch = 698 feet File: Hamblin - Change Application Hereafter POU - Section 26.des 
Data and Deed Call Listing of File: Hamblin - Change Application Hereafter POU - Section 26.des 
Tract 1: 640.000 Acres: 27878400 Sq Feet: Closure = nOO.OOOOe 0.00 Feet: Precision >l/999999: Perimeter = 21120 Feet 
Tract 2: 7.000 Acres: 304920 Sq Feet: Closure = nOO.OOOOe 0.00 Feet: Precision >l/999999: Perimeter = 2244 Feet 
Tract 3: 2.581 Acres: 112434 Sq Feet: Closure = n00.1804e 0.10 Feet Precision =1/13230: Perimeter - 1342 Feet 
Tract 4: 5.000 Acres: 217800 Sq Feet: Closure = nOO.OOOOe 0.00 Feet Precision >l/999999: Perimeter = 1980 Feet 
Tract 5: 0.500 Acres: 21780 Sq Feet: Closure = nOO.OOOOe 0.00 Feet: Precision > 1/999999: Perimeter = 1386 Feet 
Tract 6: 0.033 Acres: 1416 Sq Feet Closure = s30.5229e 0.01 Feet: Precision =1/20743: Perimeter = 160 Feet 


















































Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 1 East 
4-
r>, . < ~ ' 
As A 4t 




Title: Date: 08-12-2004 
Scale: 1 inch = 698 feet File: Hamblin - Change Application Hereafter POU - Section 23.des 
Data and Deed Call Listing of file: Hamblin - Change Application Hereafter POU - Section 23.des 
Tract 1: 640.000 Acres: 27878400 Sq Feet: Closure - nOO.OOOOe 0.00 Feet: Precision > 1/999999: Perimeter = 21120 Feet 
Tract 2: 7.000 Acres: 304920 Sq Feet: Closure = nOO.OOOOe 0.00 Feet: Precision >l/999999: Perimeter = 2244 Feet 
Tract 3: 5.000 Acres: 217800 Sq Feet: Closure = nOO.OOOOeO.OO Feet Precision > 1/999999: Perimeter = 1980 Feet 
Tract 4: 4.000 Acres: 174240 Sq Feet: Closure = nOO.OOOOe 0.00 Feet: Precision > 1/999999: Perimeter » 2904 Feet 







































Section 25, Township 7 South, Range 2 West 
--•ion y g - //ogy As A1 £ 
centation Of My Knowledge And Belief. 
"Vint Name). 
Title: Date: 08-12-2004 
Scale: 1 inch = 698 feet File: Hamblin - Chajtige Application Hereafter POU - Section 25.des 
.<v m i / 
Data and Deed Call Listing of File: Hamblin - Change Application Heiwter POU - Section 25,des 
Tract I: 640.000 Acres: 27878400SqFeet:Closure = n00.0000e0.00Feet: Precision>l/999999: Perimeter-21120Feet 















State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Division of Water Rights 
JON M. HUNTSMAN, JR. I MICHAEL R. STYLER JERRY D. OLDS 
Governor I Executive Director State Engineer/Division Director 
GARY R. HERBERT I 
Lieutenant Governor | 
ORDER OF THE STATE ENGINEER 
For Permanent Change Application Number 55-11041 (a29341) 
Permanent Change Application Number 55-11041 (a29341) in the names of Marilyn Hamblin, 
GCII Investments, and Highland City Corporation was filed on August 26, 2004 to change the 
point of diversion and place of use of 0.6 cfs of water as evidenced by Water Right Number 55-
11041, an award in the Provo River Decree. Heretofore, the water has been diverted from the 
Provo River. The water was used for the irrigation of 30.00 acres from April 1 to October 31. 
Hereafter, it is proposed to divert 120.00 acre-feet from the following locations: (1) Well - North 
90 feet and East 600 feet from the SlA Comer of Section 25, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (existing 16-
inch, 598 feet deep); (2) Well - North 1671 feet and East 58 feet from the SVi Comer of Section 
35, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 200-700 feet deep); (3) Well - South 84 feet and West 190 feet 
from the NE Comer of Section 3, T5S, R1E, SLB&M (existing 20-inch, 585 feet deep); (4) Well 
- South 1150 feet and 0 feet from the WA Comer of Section 26, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 
100-1000 feet deep); (5) Well - South 1490 feet and West 1500 feet from the NE Comer of 
Section 34, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 100-1000 feet deep); (6) Well - North 950 feet and 
East 310 feet from the WlA Comer of Section 36, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (existing 16-inch, 601 feet 
deep); (7) Well - South 180 feet and East 1210 feet from the NW Comer of Section 1, T5S, R1E, 
SLB&M (16-inch, 200-700 feet deep); (8) Well - North 2490 feet and East 900 feet from the SlA 
Comer of Section 2, T5S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 200-500 feet deep); (9) Well - South 740 feet 
and 0 feet from the WA Comer of Section 23, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 100-1000 feet deep). 
The nature of use of the water will remain the same as heretofore. The place of use of the water 
is being changed to all or a portion(s) of Section 23, T4S, R1E, SLB&M; Section 26, T4S, R1E, 
SLB&M; and Section 25, T7S, R2W, SLB&M. 
Notice of the application was published in the New Utah on September 9 and September 16, 
2004, and protests were received from New State, Inc. and United States Bureau of Reclamation. 
The protestants expressed concern about interference with their water rights and that the 
underlying water right not be enlarged by approval of this change application. A hearing was not 
held. 
Field reviews of the underlying water right were conducted by staff of the State Engineer's 
Office on October 5, 2004, and in the summer of 2005. While the original diversion structure 
and conveyance ditch were observed to still exist, the place of use has changed to Brigham 
Young University's facilities for producing cinema films. The improvements on the property, 
including some limited irrigation, are being supphed by a public water supply system. The ditch 
and diversion structure were not in use. Observation of the area and conversation with people 
now on the property indicates that this water right has not been used for over 20 years. 
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It appears that the extended period of nonuse of this water right may have resulted in the water 
right ceasing pursuant to Section 73-1-4 UCA. Inasmuch as beneficial use is the measure and 
limit of a water right, the underlying water right would be enlarged by approval of this change 
application causing a detriment to other rights and the hydrologic system. 
Under the provisions of Section 73-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, "When an appropriator of the 
appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a water right for 
a period of five years, the water right or unused portion of that water right ceases../' It is 
believed that it has been several years since this water right was used; therefore, it may by 
subject to non-use. As a result, this change application would result in an enlargement and 
cannot be approved. 
It is the opinion of the State Engineer that this application should be rejected because no current 
uses of water are being made and can be abandoned in order to effect the change proposed. 
In evaluating the various elements of the underlying right, it is not the intention of the State 
Engineer to adjudicate the extent of this right, but rather to provide sufficient definition of it to 
assure that other vested rights are not impaired by the change and/or no enlargement occurs. If, 
in a subsequent action, the court adjudicates that this right is entitled to either more or less water, 
the State Engineer will adjust the figures accordingly. 
It is, therefore, ORDERED and Permanent Change Application Number 55-11041 (a29341) is 
hereby REJECTED. 
Your contact with this office, should you need it, is with the Utah Lake/Jordan River Regional 
Office. The telephone number is 801-538-7240. 
This Order is subject to the provisions of Administrative Rule R655-6-17 of the Division of 
Water Rights and* to Sections 63-46b-13 and 73-3-14 of the Utah Code which provide for filing 
either a Request for Reconsideration with the State Engineer or an appeal with the appropriate 
District Court. A Request for Reconsideration must be filed with the State Engineer within 20 
days of the date of this Order. However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a prerequisite to 
filing a court appeal. A court appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of this Order, or ^ 
if a Request for Reconsideration has been filed, within 30 days after the date the Request for °^/°^c>v# 
Reconsideration is denied. A Request for Reconsideration is considered denied when no action 
is taken 20 days after the Request is filed. 
Dated this day of \&H/X/iU>^ , 2006. 
3>. O/cL 
Jetyy D. QMs, P.E., State Engineer 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Order this 7^>\) day of jClt^Uf^iU^y— . 2006 to 
Marilyn Hamblin 
2242 North 390 East 
Provo, UT 84604 
GCII Investments 
242 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Highland City Corporation 
5378 West 10400 North 
Highland, UT 84058 
Brad Cahoon, Attorney for Marilyn Hamblin 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
New State, Inc. 
c/p Stephen C. Bamberger 
PO Box 58483 
Salt Lake City, UT 84158-8483 
United States Bureau of Reclamation 
c/o Jonathan B. Jones 
302 East 1860 South 
Provo, UT 84606-7317 
WXM4H^Y~ 
BY: 
Kelly K. Hogne, Appropriation Secretary 
Tab 10 
FtateofUtah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL J^SUUKUGS 
Division of Water Rights 
JON M. HUNTSMAN, JR. I MICHAEL R. STYLER JERRY D. OLDS 
Governor I Executive Director State Engineer/Division Director 
GARY R. HERBERT I 
Lieutenant Governor | 
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For Permanent Change Application Number 55-11041 (a29341) 
Permanent Change Application Number 55-11041 (a29341) in the names oi Marilyn Hamblin, 
GCII Investments, and Highland City Corporation was filed on August 26, 2004 to change the 
point of diversion and place of use of 0.6 cfe of water as evidenced by Water Right Number 55-
11041, an award in the Provo River Decree. Heretofore, the water has been diverted from Spring 
Creek and Provo River. The water was used for the irrigation of 30.00 acres from April 1 to 
October 31. 
Hereafter, it is proposed to divert 120.00 acre-feet from the following locations: (1) Well - North 
90 feet and Bast 600 feet from the SlA Corner of Section 25, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (existing 16-
inch, 598 feet deep); (2) Well - North 1671 feet and East 58 feet from the SVi Comer of Section 
35, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 200-700 feet deep); (3) Well - South 84 feet and West 190 feet 
from the NE Corner of Section 3, T5S, RIB, SLB&M (existing 20-ineb, 585 feet deep); (4) Well 
- South 1150 feet and 0 feet from the WA Comer of Section 26, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 
100-1000 feet deep); (5) Well - South 1490 feet and West 1500 feet from the NE Corner of 
Section 34, T4S, RIB, SLB&M (16-inch, 100-1000 feet deep); (6) Well - North 950 feet and 
East 310 feet from the W% Corner of Section 36, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (existing 16-inch, 601 feet 
deep); (7) Well - South 180 feet and East 1210 feet from the NW Corner of Section 1, T5S, R1E, 
SLB&M (16-inch, 200-700 feet deep); (8) Well - North 2490 feet and East 900 feet from the S J& 
Corner of Section 2, T5S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 200-500 feet deep); (9) Well - South 740 feet 
and 0 feet from the Ntt Corner of Section 23, T4S, R1E, SLB&M (16-inch, 100-1000 feet deep). 
The nature of use of the water will remain the same as heretofore. The place of use of the water 
is being changed to all or a portion(s) of Section 23, T4S, R1E, SLB&M; Section 26, T4S, R1E, 
SLB&M; and Section 25, T7S, R2W, SLB&M. 
Notice of the application was published in the New Utah on September 9 and September 16, 
2004, and protests were received from New State, Inc. and United States Bureau of Reclamation. 
The protestants expressed concern about interference with their water rights and that the 
underlying water right not be enlarged by approval of this change application. 
By Order of the State Engineer dated January 30, 2006, this application was rejected. An 
administrative hearing was not held prior to the issuance of that decision. The applicants sought 
de novo review of the decision in the Fourth District Court before Judge Fred D. Howard. Judge 
Howard remanded the matter to the State Engineer for further administrative review. 
Accordingly, on December 5, 2007, the State Engineer conducted a hearing on the application. 
At the hearing, the applicants presented legal theories and interpretations of various Sections of 
73-3 of the Utah Code including that Ms. Hamblin is entitled to the use of water solely by virtue 
of asserting ownership of an award to A.L. Tanner in the Provo River Decree (the Decree) and 
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that the State Engineer cannot consider the historical use of water within his administrative 
review of change applications filed under Utah Code Section 73-3-3. 
In her Report of Conveyance submitted to the State Engineer in 2004, Hamblin asserted she 
acquired ownership of Water Right No. 55-11041 from Brigham Young University in 2002 -
approximately 45 years after the property to which the water was appurtenant was conveyed to 
BYU.1 The 30 acres believed to have been irrigated by AJL. Tanner in the 1921 Decree is now 
the "film studio" property of BYU campus. From discussions between the State Engineer's 
Office and BYU employees, personal observation during site visits by State Engineer staff, and 
as represented in documents received from BYU, no use of any water from 55-11041 has been 
made by BYU since at least 1980.2 Although the 1921 Decree lists the right for 30 acres of 
irrigation in AX. Tanner, none of the parties to this change application, including Hamblin, were 
able to provide any personal knowledge of the use of the water sought to be changed, and did not 
offer any information to contradict that BYU has not used the water right. Applicants have 
alleged that because the water in Spring Creek has recently ceased to flow due to urbanization in 
the area, they were excused from beneficially using the water. However, the Decree states that 
Spring Creek users may take water from Spring. Creek and/or the Provo River. No evidence has 
been submitted to assert that water under this right was diverted from the Provo River to 
supplement or replace any deficiency in Spring Creek. 
Section 73-1-3, unchanged since 1919, sums up a bedrock principle of Utah water law. 
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in 
this state." Not only is this principle codified in statute, it appears several times in the Decree. 
For example, page 75, section 124 of the Decree says: 
It is further ordered adjudged and decreed, that all the rights declared and decreed 
herein are founded upon appropriation of water necessary for some beneficial use, 
and all such rights are subject in their exercise to the conditions that they are 
required and necessary for beneficial uses and all such rights are expressly subject 
to the limitations and conditions that all of such water is used for some beneficial 
purpose and is used economically, without waste, and with due care, and is 
reasonablv and fairlv necessarv for such use. 
1
 Prior to the December 5* hearing, the State Engineer provided to all parties copies of documents obtained from 
BYU that indicate how Hamblin approached BYU about 55-11041 which led to Hamblin's acquisition of the right 
To BYU, Hamblin asserted ownership of the water right through a 1913 deed, and because of Aat "cloud" on 
BYU's title, offered to lease the water under the right to BYU. After obtaining a quitclaim deed from BYU, 
Hamblin then submitted a report of conveyance to the State Engineer claiming ownership through BYU. When 
asked for additional information on the discrepancy between the ownership claims to BYU and to the State 
Engineer, Hamblin offered no explanation. 
2
 BYU employees seriously doubt they have ever used water from 55-11041 since acquiring the property — but 
from first hand employee knowledge, they have not used the right since at least 1980. 
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That all the rights declared and decreed herein are awarded for the beneficial uses 
specified and none of the parties hereto, or their successors in interest, whether 
heirs, executors, administrators, successors or assigns, shall divert any of the 
waters of said Provo River, or any of its tributaries, excqpt for beneficial use, and 
whenever such use has ceased such party or parties shall cease to divert, and shall 
have no right to divert, the said waters, or any part thereoff.] 
Decree, page 75, section 124 
The beneficial use of water establishes the measure and limit of all Utah water rights.3 As the 
Decree reiterates, water users have an ongoing responsibility to fully use the water to which they 
are entitled Use of water is a litmus test for whether a right remains valid and a framework to 
evaluate the water right when a change application is filed. Without the beneficial use of water, 
other water users cannot determine the existence of a water right or its validity and the State 
Engineer cannot administer the uses of water or fulfill other statutory duties. Filing for an 
extension of time or a non-use application pursuant to 73-1-4 notifies the public of a water user's 
intent to maintain the validity of a right when he is not actually beneficially using it Here, no 
application for non-use was ever filed. 
Since Section 73-1-3 states that beneficial use is the basis, the measure, and limit of a water 
right, inasmuch as these applicants, cannot confirm that water has been beneficially used under 
the right sought to be changed and the State Engineer's investigation found no evidence of 
beneficial use, the State Engineer cannot quantify the right or determine if any water use under 
this right continues to exist which can be changed. 
Just as beneficial use is the measure and limit of a right, beneficial use is the standard by which 
changes are measured under Section 73-3-3 - the statute by which the State Engineer addresses 
change applications. 
3
 The applicants argue that water law principles are controverted where die Provo River Decree, before delineating 
water rights and associated acreage for each, notes: "Spring Creek. As tenants in common in the right to the use of 
water from Spring Creek and Provo River, in Utah County, Utah." Page 19, section 22. Contrary to their application 
form and title report, Applicants now argue that the subsequent separated rights are held together as one right, and 
that the use of one of those rights acts to preserve them all. In other words, the argument seems to be mat one user, 
entitled to irrigate perhaps 5 acres, may - by irrigating only his own 5 acres - thereby preserve his own use for 5 
acres of irrigated land, and preserve the use for 30 acres under Water Right No. 55-11041, and innumerable other 
acreage plots. This runs directly contrary to not only the Utah Code, 73-1-3, but also established case law and the 
Decree itself. A water user cannot claim or preserve a right to more than he beneficially uses. 
Further, the Spring Creek water users are not (and are not decreed to be) an association which holds a common 
beneficial use. The Decree, which elsewhere defines a "[Jointly and undivided" common use to an acreage amount 
(pages 22-23, section 23), defines each Spring Creek right by its own beneficial use. Although the Spring Creek 
users have a common right to the water source (and thereby take turns using the whole of it\ each number of 
irrigated acres (each beneficial use), is individually listed and must be independently maintained by its own 
beneficial use. For many reasons, applicants* argument that the tenancy in common language allows some unknown 
user to preserve all the Spring Creek rights fails. 
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Section 73-3-3 has several subsections that apply to Hamblin's application. Section 73-3-3(1 )(a) 
states, 
"Permanent changes" means changes for an indefinite length of time with an 
intent to relinquish the original point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use. 
Likewise, Section 73-3-3(4)(bXv), mandates that the applicant identify and set forth "the point 
on the stream or source where the water is diverted" and Section 73-3-3(4)(b)(vii), requires that 
the applicant identify and set forth "the place, purpose, and extent of the present use." Of 
particular importance is Section 73-3-3(2)(a) which allows a "person entitled to the use of water" 
to file a change application. Also important are the provisions of Section 73-l-4(3)(a) which 
provides that where water use under a water right ceases for a five year period, the iCwater right 
ceases." 
Just as the need for an ongoing beneficial use pervades the water statutes, a water user seeking 
approval of a change application must provide the location of the existing point of diversion, the 
place of use and the extent of the present use of the water sought to be changed. The statute 
requires applicants to supply such information and that information must be considered by the 
State Engineer in evaluating an application for change. 
As mentioned, Ms. Hamblin has established no beneficial use under the water right for Change 
Application Number 55-11041 (a29341) since at least 1980. Based on the Section 73-3-3 (and 
73-3-1) requirements to identify and establish current beneficial use, Ms. Hamblin's failure to 
present such information on her application form as required in Section 73-3-3(4)(b)(v) and (vii), 
and because Ms. Hamblin is not a '^ person entitled to the use of water" under Section 73-3-
3(2Xa) for the purpose of filing a change application, the State Engineer must reject this 
application. 
Nevertheless, the Fourth District Court November 26, 2007 Order directed that the State 
Engineer "will specify his reasons and any statutory basis for approval or rejection of, Plaintiffs 
Permanent Change Application No. a29341 filed August 26, 2004 in a revised order." The State 
Engineer interprets this to mean he should evaluate the application based on all criteria in 
Section 73-3-3 and 73-3-8. 
The State Engineer has considered the criteria for approval of a change application contained in 
Section 73-3-8(1). The decision in Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989), as well as 73-
3-3(5)(a), require the state engineer to review and evaluate change applications based on 
essentially the same criteria as applications to appropriate. The requirements for approval, and 
the State Engineer's reasoning with respect to each, follow. 
Permanent Change Application Number 
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Subsection (a)(i), 'there is unappropriated water in the proposed source." In a water 
system that is fully appropriated like Utah Valley,4 all available water is being placed to 
beneficial use or covered by valid existing water rights. Therefore, as applied to change 
applications, (he only "unappropriated water" available for use in a new location must be 
the water use discontinued in the original place of use. New uses of water not 
accompanied by discontinued uses take water from other users in the system. Where 
neither BYU, Ms. Hamblin, nor any other water user has beneficially used water under 
Water Right No. 55-11041 at its original place of use or any other location, there is no 
water from any current use to act as the necessary "unappropriated water" to fulfill the 
need for water which is used in the new location. Therefore, the application fails to meet 
this requirement 
Subsection (a)(ii) "the proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the 
more beneficial use of the water." Generally, absent localized interference problems, if a 
proposed change does not create a situation where more water will be diverted or 
depleted from the hydrologic system than has been beneficially used under the historic 
water right, impairment of other rights within the system will not occur. However, 
granting a change application where no valid current use can be discontinued to support 
the change creates a new depletion from the system. In a system that is Mly 
appropriated, existing rights are therefore inescapably impaired by any new depletion. In 
the case of this application, the historic use of the water cannot be identified and therefore 
cannot be discontinued. Therefore, the application fails to meet this requirement 
Subsection (a)(iii) <cthe proposed plan is physically and economically feasible, unless the 
application is filed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, and would not prove 
detrimental to the public welfare." The proposed plan would be physically feasible if 
historic uses could be identified and discontinued. Where there is no use to discontinue, 
this requirement is not met. The State Engineer presumes the proposal is economically 
feasible since the new diversion requires only the use of existing diversion works. 
Therefore, the application meets this requirement. 
Subsection (a)(iv) "the applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed 
works." The State Engineer presumes the applicant or co-applicants have the financial 
ability to implement this application. Therefore, the application meets this requirement. 
Subsection (a)(v) "the application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of 
speculation or monopoly." Solely for the purposes of this application, it is the opinion of 
the State Engineer that there is reason to believe that filing this application to establish 
additional irrigation water rights for Highland City meets this criteria assuming the City 
is in need of such water. Should a court desire to further investigate if the applicants are 
4
 No apphcation to appropriate water such as the volume involved in 55-11041 has been approved in Utah Valley for 
over 40 years. Small domestic applications were approved for some time after that, but even those have long been 
discontinued. 
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acting in good faith or for the purpose of speculation, the State Engineer could assist as 
directed in this matter. 
Subsection (b)(i) states that if the state engineer has reason to believe that an application 
will interfere with its more beneficial use, unreasonably affect public recreation or the 
natural stream environment, or prove detrimental to the public welfare, approval or 
rejection of the application is to be withheld until the state engineer has investigated the 
matter. As explained under the (a)(i) requirement, since this application is for a change 
in a fully or over appropriated system and no valid existing use is being retired, this 
application would prove detrimental to other valid existing water uses and the fully-
appropriated ground water resource, and therefore the public welfare, if it were approved. 
Until the state engineer and other water users are provided the historic place of use and 
can evaluate those uses, it is the opinion of the state engineer that this application is 
detrimental to the public welfare and therefore fails to meet this requirement 
Subsection (b)(ii) directs the state engineer to reject any application that does not meet 
the criteria of this section. 
After carefully considering the merits of the water right and the assertions of the applicants, it 
remains the opinion of the State Engineer that this application must be rejected because it fails to 
meet the criteria of Sections 73-3-3 and 73-3-8 as outlined above. 
It is, therefore, ORDERED and Permanent Change Application Number 55-11041 (a29341) is 
hereby REJECTED. 
This Order is subject to the provisions of Administrative Rule R655-6-17 of the Division of 
Water Rights and to Sections 63-46b-13 and 73-3-14 of the Utah Code which provide for filing 
either a Request for Reconsideration with the State Engineer or for de novo review in an 
appropriate Utah State district court. A Request for Reconsideration must be filed with the State 
Engineer within 20 days of the date of this Order. However, a Request for Reconsideration is 
not a prerequisite to filing for de novo review. De novo judicial review must be sought within 30 
days after the date of this Order, or if a Request for Reconsideration has been filed, within 30 
days after the date the Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for Reconsideration is 
considered denied when no action is taken 20 days after the Request is filed. 
Dated this M[ day of J f i ^ ^ ^ 
J e # D. QMs, P.E., State Engineer 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Order this T - day of /fe^72<^frfc/U, 2008 to: 
Marilyn Hamblin 
2242 North 390 East 
Provo, UT 84604 
GCII Investments 
242 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Highland City Corporation 
5378 West 10400 North 
Highland, UT 84058 
Brad Cahoon, Attorney for Marilyn Hamblin 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
New State, Inc. 
c/p Stephen C. Bamberger 
PO Box 58483 
Salt Lake City, UT 84158-8483 
United States Bureau of Reclamation 
c/o Jonathan B. Jones 
302 East 1860 South 
Provo, UT 84606-7317 
BY: -fy/jL* £ . Jh^y 
Kelly K. Hqrne, Appropriation Secretary 
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Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 




DEE C. HANSEN, State Engineer 
of the State of Utah; and 
Utah State Division of 
Wi1dli fe Resources, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
No- 860614 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal by Nephi City from an Order and 
Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park 
presiding, thereby upholding certain decisions of the State 
Engineer of the State of Utah rejecting Nephi City's Change 
Applications for a permanent change of point of diversion 
with respect to certain water rights, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Nephi City timely brought this action to appeal certain 
decisions of the State Engineer rejecting Nephi City's 
Change Applications for a permanent change of point of 
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diversion with respect to certain water rights- Nephi City 
subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
defendants then filed a cross-motion for Summary Judgment. 
Each party submitted a Memorandum of Law in support of their 
Motions for Summary Judgment. A hearing was held before the 
District Court where the Court heard oral arguments, after 
which the Distict Court entered its Order and Judgment 
granting the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denying Neph i City's Motion for Summary Judgment, from which 
this appeal is taken* 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issue raised by this appeal is whether fht State 
Engineer may constitutionally declare a municipal 
corporation's water right forfeited for non-use pursuant to 
section 73-1-4 U.C.A. 1953 as amended given the provisions 
of Article XI Section 6 of the Utah Constitution which in 
essence states that a municipality within the State of Utah 
may not transfer or dispose of its water rights except m 
exchange for a water right or water supply of equal value* 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
ARTICLE XI SECTION 6, UTAH CONSTITUTION 
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Tab 
Utah Legislative Session 
HB69 
House Floor Debate 
Day 15-1/29/1996 
House Madam Reading Clerk. 
Speaker 
(HS) 
Clerk HB 69, Forfeiture of Water Rights by David Ure. Committee vote, 12 yes 1 no 5 
absent. 
HS Rep 1 Ire 
Rep. Ure Thank you Mr. Speaker. The following two bills, both were came through an ad hoc 
task force that was appointed by the chairmen of the Natural Resource Committee 
during interim. It was chaired by Ted Stewart with Bob Morgan as assistant, who 
was the State Water Engineer, there were various interests from all over the State of 
Utah, we had probably five or six of the best water attorneys in the State of Utah 
attend these hearings. We had all the different major water controllers in Utah, the 
Weber Davis Water Basin, the Salt Lake City Water District, the CUP was involved. 
We tried to cover most everyone we could in this ad hoc task force. What we did 
was finally establish a way that water might be forfeited after it's had a five years 
non-use in the State of Utah. We did nothing to change that part of the code. We 
only established a way that the foreclosure might come close - might finally be 
complete. We did this for several reasons; Number one, probably number one, was 
to take the cloud off many of the decreed water rights in the State of Utah that 
someone has always said, "Well Great-Great Grandfather said that he didn't use his 
water for five years so therefore that water right has really been forfeited back to the 
State. Well, the same problem was also greatly addressed by the financial 
institutions. Water stock has been used or decreed water has been used as a 
collateral for many of the financial institutions in the State of Utah. And with that 
cloud back there, thirty, forty, fifty years, and Great Grandpa died a year ago so we 
can't use him for verification whether it was right or wrong. We needed to do 
something to bring that cloud to a close, and this is what we have done. We have 
said that if a person starts to store up their water rights, or reuse them again, then if 
they have harmed someone downstream, then they have twenty years to protest that. 
And when I say protest it, I mean they have to take them to court and prove that this 
person did not use their water rights for five years during such and such an era. Arid 
it's only through the court system that this can be completed. And this is virtually 
what we have done, this has been through the Natural Resource Committee now 
three times. It has never received a negative vote, it has been questioned by the 
people at the Natural Resources and hopefully all of the bugs have been worked out 
of it. Any amendments that have been proposed have always gone back to the 
original committee so that all of the attorneys agreed that the words that were being 
used were exactly what they meant. And so these are the words, these are the - this 
is the amendment that has been proposed by this ad hoc task force and they're all 
feeling comfortable with what they have done. With that Mr. Speaker, 1 would hope 
that no questions would come forth. 
HS If you could see what I could see [laughter], Rep. Valentine 
Rep. Thank you Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield to some questions? 
Valentine 
Rep. Ure Yes, 
HS Yes, you may proceed. 
Rep. Sorry about that Representative. I've gotta understand it and I have to almost make 
Valentine a record to make certain that I understand it. Under House Bill 69 as you have it 
drafted, does this forfeit municipal and county water rights ifthey are not used in 
accordance with - as outlined in this bill? 
Rep. Ure There is no one exempt, but it has to be a decreed water right. If you own water in 
say the Beaver Creek Water Company, this will not pertain to you, but if you have a 
decreed water right, yes. No one is exempt from this. 
Rep. So even a municipality could lose its decreed water rights if it is not being used? 
Valentine 
Rep. Ure Correct. But Representative, it's already in place. Ifthey have not used it now, then 
it still reverts back to the State of Utah. 
Rep. So what is the purpose of the bill? 
Valentine 
Rep. Ure It's to make a way to finally bring it to court ~ see there is no process in place for 
which the forfeiture finally came closed and this is the reason for it. If a 
municipality already has not been using their water rights, by state law it has already 
been forfeited. But no one has used - used the way to show that it has been 
forfeited. 
Rep. So there is no way presently to actually show a forfeiture of water rights? 
Valentine 
Rep. Ure Correct. 
Rep. So there has never been any water right forfeited in the state since the day we were 
Valentine made a state? 
9502543 1 O O 0 
Rep. Ure Uh - 1 could not answer that question. I don't know, Pd have to ask the Water 




It looks like he's on 111*' plioiu at 11 lis moment. 






Obviously water is one of the very most important things in this whole state, and 
before we go and do something to water, I really feel like I oughta understand it. 
I've read the bill, I've read it a couple times, Pm not sure I understand it anymore 
than I did before. But it is one that Pm concerned about, I also need to declare a 
potential conflict of interest to this body; I am presently on the Orem Metropolitan 
Water Board. Thank you Mr. Speaker. 
Thank you. Representative Gam 






Yes, you may proceed. 
I guess Pm like Representative Valentine, Pm trying to understand this bill and the 
concern that I have is the notification. Let's assume somebody goes five years 
without using their water. Tell me the notification process that occurs? 
Rep. Ure Now you're saying that Kevin Gam has gone five years without using his water? 
Rep. Yes 
Gam 
Rep. Ure There is not a notification, but had Kevin Gam applied for an extension of his water 
rights that would have been granted by the State of Utah. To further, uh, carry out 
your water rights for non-use. See there haven't been notifications sent out, but you 
haven't been using your water. See if you have your well and you have 380 acre 
feet of decreed water in your well, the State of Utah doesn't know whether you use 
that or not. 
Rep. I guess what Pm concerned about is that the state is term mating water ri^hls wilhoul 
Gam notification and -
R ep I Ire Only, no - okay, I see what your question is. There would be notification, if I were 
to protest you, there would be notification sent to you that I was taking you to court 
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for forfeiture of your water. The due process is taking place; all parties are being 
notified that the court hearing is taking place. No water rights will be taken away 
without your knowledge. 
Rep. Okay, so if I don't use my water, then I am notified that the state could terminate 
Garn that right? 
Rep. Ure Yes, in the final court action, you will be notified yes. 
Rep. Okay now over on page 3, line 18, it says: ccthe appropriator's water right ceases and 
Garn the water reverts to the public if they"- and then down to 22, "if the State Engineer 
denies the application for an extension of time." What does that mean? Are we 
vesting an authority with the State Engineer that maybe goes beyond want we really 
want to have happen? 
Rep. Ure Give me that question again please? 
Rep. Well, the concern that I have is are we giving to much power to the State Engineer? 
Garn It says, "if the State Engineer denies the application for extension of time." What's 
the basis for that denial if that happens? 
Rep. Ure Well, first of all, the State Water Engineer already has that authority now. This is 
just being put in another place, but he already has that authority now and it's has 
been granted to him since the State Water Engineer was put into place. Well, if a 
person comes in and asks twice for an extension of his water right, he does deny 
that. But everything is still - ask me the question again so I can remember this time. 
Rep. I guess the concern is that the State Engineer can deny applications for the extension 
Garn of time. Is there due process somewhere in there? Can he just do it at will? Is there 
some procedure he has to follow? 
Rep. Ure Well, yes he has his rules already written out, he falls under the Administrative 
Rules Code, and so the rules are already in place the first five years of extension, he 
has to give that to you automatically. If you have some extenuating circumstances, 
like you had a broken leg for four years, and you were going to use it the next four 
years, then he could take that as a process and which he could give you an extension 
extending your rights. 
Rep. Okay, I think you've answered my concerns. I was concerned about the notification 
Garn process, and if it was -
Rep. Ure They are all in place. 
Rep. Alright, thank you. 
Garn 
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HS Representative Brown. 
Rep. Fellow Representatives, let me give you a little bit of background on this bill. Last 
Brown year I actually sponsored this bill and in the process there were a number who felt 
they needed some time to negotiate and come up with the right proposal so that both 
the municipalities -and this was the question asked by Representative Valentine and 
others- had some protection. Under the current law, let me give you the scenario 
that exists. If you buy a piece of land, or you think you own a water right and when 
title is changed to a piece of property that has water attached to it, if anywhere in the 
history of that water right they can go back and find that that water hadn't been used 
for five years, that right is automatically forfeited under current law. In other words, 
if Representative Hickman bought a ranch, he's turned into a big cattle baron now, 
and with that came a water right, a decreed water right, but in the process of 
exchanging the deeds and so on, somebody said "hey this right wasn't used, because 
some little old lady that owned the land didn't put the water to the correct use," they 
could challenge the legality of his water rights and say that its now publically owned 
because it wasn't used. So, what we're trying to do is put a process in place that 
protects people, not gives them more exposure. Whether it's individual water 
owners or municipalities or what. Now even in this bill, the challenge of your water 
rights must be brought about in court action. In other words, if no one says anything 
about your non-use, then it is still your water right. But if someone decides that you 
haven't utilized that water right and wants to challenge it, they can do it through 
court. Now, you can apply for an extension and that notification clause in this bill 
just deals with the extension. You have to be notified when your extension is 
expiring. And so the whole premise of this bill is not to put at risk a water right, i H tt 
is to put into place a process so that water rights can be better and more easily 
protected so that they can't be lost just from non-use without any recourse. Thank 
you. 
Thank you. Rep. Johnston. The Motion to Abolish a Majority Caucus, 
[chuckles] Fve got a little different motion than that one. The motion that I have is 
an amendment. This bill has been explained to you pretty well and it's been 
unanimously received. It's been during legislative interim it was discussed very 
well. There has only been one question that's ever been raised and that's what the 
period of time should be -
HS Rep. Johnston, are you speaking to the amendment? 
Rep. Right, let me give you the amendment. 
Johnston 
HS Give me the amendment and then reserve the right to speak to us. 
Rep. Okay, on page one, line 21, change twenty years to ten. On page one, line 23, the 







what this bills doing, are very supportive of the bill, this is absolutely necessary, the 
only question is, How long should it be? And that's what we've discussed and I've 
come to the opinion that most people are decided that ten years is a better number, it 
just gives quicker protection, it makes it better for the people that own the water, it 
also makes it more legitimate for a banker to be able to use it as collateral. During 
the period of time I've worked on this I come to the opinion that ten years is better 
and most everyone agree including the sponsor of the legislation. I'm open for any 
questions. 
Thank you Representative. I've cleared the board to Representative Johnston's 
motion to amend to strike twenty and replace with ten at line 21 and again at line 23 
of the bill. Representative Davis. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker. Would the sponsor of the amendment yield for a question 
please? 
Rep. Ure Yes. 
Rep. Thank you, [inaudible] let me declare a conflict of interest myself. I am an irrigation 
Davis user on an old agreement within our area, The Parley's Water Users' Association. If 
I take a look at this, irrigation water in my instance is brought by conveyance to the 
property, it's not an irrigation company or anything, it's conveyed to the property. 
Then knowing that the property in this area changes hands roughly every fifteen to 
twenty years, one might sell their property. If one does not use that and a new 
property owner comes into effect fifteen years later they would have no chance to 
reestablish their water rights? That was pertinent to the land under your motion, but 
if we left it for twenty years, they could reestablish those rights, is that right? 
Rep. Ure Well, actually you're confusing the issue just a little bit, this doesn't change any of 
the risk that you have to lose the water rights, the only thing this does is increase 
your ability to prove up on those rights and make them absolutely 100% proved. If 
we take the example that has been presented, say 100 years ago there's someone that 
didn't use your water for five years, you know this water's allocated and then it 
comes to you, that person didn't use that and someone discovers that it wasn't used, 
then they could file a lawsuit against you to forfeit your water rights that you now 
have. This bill provides that if after that time that if it has been used for ten years 
correctly and you can prove it's been used for ten years then your water right is safe, 
so it actually makes your water right safer than if you have the twenty year period. 
Rep. 
Davis 
Okay, thank you. 
HS Representative Wright. 
Rep. Thank you, I'd like to write in support of the amendment. That's a good 
Wright amendment. When you are in jeopardy of losing a water right [inaudible] that's 
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been mentioned, from ten to twenty years puts that water right in limbo for a long 
time. If we lower this down to ten, it has a shorter window on this and someone can 
prove up on their water, have the ability to use that water and protect that water 
right. As Representative Johnston has mentioned, when you have it open for twenty 
years, then it puts some liability on property, it puts some liability on water because 
of financing or any other mortgages that you might want to use to operate, this puts 
them in limbo and there's some jeopardy of losing that. There are lots of changes 
we know with development in the State of Utah, there are lots of changes and those 
changes are fast coming, it's almost inappropriate to be able to go out there twenty 
years and someone be able file a lien or something on your water rights. Pd 
encourage your support of the amendment down to ten years. Thank you. 
HS Thank you Rep. Wright. Any further debate on the motion to amendment? 
Representative Knutson? 




Will you yii 
Yes. 
Rep. Thank you very much. The question I have is, "How does one define use?" and 
Knutson before you answer that, if a person is paying for the use of the water but is not using 
it, does that constitute he's using the water? He is paying for it, but maybe not using 
i t 
Rep. Ure We've got the State Engineer here that could answer that. Maybe [inaudible] can. 
What - as you know, water is from the very beginning is predicated on use. The first 
one that used it developed that right, if there is water left over then the next one, and 
so on. So, beneficial use is the key word. What's beneficial? I can't answer that, 
but Bob Morgan could, we may can get him to do that but actually if you use the 
water, whatever you're using it for, if it's a beneficial use, that constitutes that. 
Rep. Thank you. The reason I ask the question Mr. Speaker is that there are some 
Knutson circumstances of which I'm aware wherein a property owner is paying for the right 
to use water, but because facilities have been built that prevent his use at the current 
time, he can't use it but would use it if he could. Now, maybe someday down the 
road that access or ability to access that water will change and he will be able to do 
so, and he continues to pay for the water right. Is that considered a use? 
Rep. Ure We'll get that answer in just a second that is a real concern because I know there's a 
lot of water that's in that particular limbo situation, This legislation doesn't address 
that question. 
Urn I uiulersliiiKl Ilia!, Lml where on the law it states that if he's not using the water he'll 
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Knutson forfeit it, it doesn't seem right if he can't access it. 
Rep. Ure We'll find out. 
Rep. Thank you. 
Knutson 
Rep. Ure Thank you Representative. Representative Harwood. 
Rep. Thank you Mr. Speaker. I move to circle the bill, and I'm doing it particularly not as 
Knutson a substitute so this amendment will still be pending when we un-circle it, if we can 
un-circle it today. The reason that I'm making the motion is because in discussion 
with John and with the State Engineer and others, there needs to be at least one 
clarifying amendment to have this operate the way that it needs to operate and that 
language needs to be worked out. So, if you wouldn't mind I would anticipate un-
circling it just as quickly as we've got the language ready to go. 
HS Okay, thank you Representative. Motion to circle? Representative Iverson? 
Rep. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I would just - was going to stand to speak in favor of the 
Iverson amendment. 
HS Thank you. Motion to circle? We'll get back to you. Representative Ure. 
Rep. Ure Do I get to add on to the discussion? 
HS Yes. 
Rep. Ure I would go along with - concur with the motion to circle right now. 
HS Anyone else in favor of the motion to circle? All those in favor of the motion to 




HS It's circled. 
* * * * jcxTrj * * * * 
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Tab _3 
Utah Legislative Session 
HB69 
Excerpt of House Floor Debate 
Day 16-1/30/1996 
House Speaker Representative Ure. 
Rep. I Ire Thank you Mr. Speaker. I move to un-circle HB 69. 
House Speaker I have <i muliun In tin \ IK le HB (>9. Would yan suite the title- of thr hill? 
Rep. Ure Forfeiture of water rights. 
House Speaker Forfeiture of water rights,, [inaudible] , , motion to un-circle. Any and all in 
favor say 'aye.' 
[ayes] 
House Speaker Opposed, no ... 
House Speaker Motion carries, the bill's un-circled, you may proceed . . . 
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This bill protects specific entities from forfeiting a water right because of nonuse. 
Highlighted Provisions: 
This bill: 
• defines terms; 
• changes the nonuse period of a water right from five to seven years; 
• clarifies the forfeiture procedure and the distribution of water after a forfeiture; 
• allows a shareholder to file a nonuse application; 
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37 • protects a water right from forfeiture if: 
38 • a public water supplier holds the water for the reasonable future water 
39 requirements of the public and in some cases, receives approval of a change 
40 application; 
41 • the land where the water is used is under a fallowing program; 
42 • water is not available because of distribution based on priority date; 
43 • the water is stored in an aquifer; 
44 • a storage water right is not used in certain circumstances; and 
45 • another water source is available for the beneficial use; 
46 • establishes how the reasonable future water requirements of the public are 
47 determined; 
48 • describes how a community water system's projected service area is determined; 
49 • changes the requirements for a nonuse application; 
50 • clarifies the effect of a nonuse application; 
51 • allows an applicant to file a subsequent nonuse application; 
52 • authorizes the state engineer to use fees to hire staff; and 
53 • makes technical changes. 
54 Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
55 None 
56 Other Special Clauses: 
57 None 
58 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
59 AMENDS: 
60 73-1-4, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2007, Chapters 136 and 329 
61 73-2-14, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2007, Chapter 314 
62 
63 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
64 Section 1. Section 73-1-4 is amended to read: 
nr"*rn* 
9 / / 
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65 73-1-4. Reversion to the public by abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse within 
66 seven years — Nonuse application. 
67 [(1) (a) hi order to further the state policy of seeming the maximum use and benefit of 
68 its scarce water resources, a person entitled to the use of water has a continuing obligation to 
69 place all of a water right to beneficial use.] 
70 [(b) The forfeiture of all or part of any right to use water for failure to place all or part 
71 of the water to beneficial use makes possible the allocation and use of water consistent with 
72 long established beneficial use concepts.] 
73 [(c) The provisions of Subsections (2) through (6) shall be construed to carry out the 
74 purposes and policies set forth in this Subsection (1).] 
75 [(2)] (1} As used in this section[, "public water]:. 
76 (a) "Public entity" means: 
77 (i) the United States: 
78 (ii) an agency of the United States; 
79 (iii) the state; 
BO (jy) a state agency; 
>» 
81 (v) a political subdivision of the state; or 
%.* 
82 (vi) an agency of a political subdivision of the states 
83 (b) "Public water supplier" means an entity that: 
84 (i) supplies water, directly or indirectly, to the public for municipal, domestic, or 
85 industrial use: and 
86 (ii) is: . 
87 (A) a public entity; 
88 (B) a water corporation, as defined in Section 54-2-1, that is regulated by the Public 
89 Service Commission; 
90 (Q a community water system: 
91 (D that: 
9 2
 (Aa) supplies water to at least 100 service connections used by year-round residents: or 
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93 (Bb) regularly serves at least 200 year-round residents; and 
94 (ID whose voting members: 
95 (Aa) own a share in the community water system; 
96 (Bb) receive water from the community water system in proportion to the member's 
97 share in the community water system; and 
98 (Cc) pay the rate set by the community water system based on the water the member 
99 receives; or 
100 (D) a water users association: 
101 (D in which one or more public entities own at least 70% of the outstanding shares; and 
102 (ID that is a local sponsor of a water project constructed by the United States Bureau 
103 of Reclamation. 
104 (c) "Shareholder" is as defined in Section 73-3-3.5. 
105 (d) "Water company" is as defined in Section 73-3-3.5. 
106 (e) "Water supply entity" means an entity that supplies water as a utility service or for 
107 irrigation purposes and is also: 
108 [fa)] (!) a municipality, water conservancy district, metropolitan water district, irrigation 
109 district, or other public agency; 
110 [fb)] (ii) a water company regulated by the Public Service Commission; or 
1 l i [fe)] (iii) any other owner of a community water system. 
112 [(3)] (2} (a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons 
H3 or ceases to use all or a portion of a water right for a period of [five] seven years, the water 
114 right or the unused portion of that water right [ceases and the water reverts to the public] is 
115 subject to forfeiture in accordance with Subsection (2)(c)% unless[, before the expiration of the 
116 five-year period,] the appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest files a [verified] 
117 nonuse application with the state engineer. 
118 (b) (i) A nonuse application may be filed on all or a portion of the water right, including 
119 water rights held by [mutual irrigation companies] a water company. 
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121 giving written notice to the water company, a shareholder may file a nonuse [applications] 
122 application with the state engineer on the water represented by the stock. 
123 (c) (i) A water right or a portion of the water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial 
124 action to declare the right forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest 
125 period of nonuse of at least [five] seven years. 
126 (ii) If forfeiture is asserted in an action for general determination of rights in 
127 conformance with the provisions of Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, the 15-year 
128 limitation period shall commence to run back in time from the date the state engineer's 
129 proposed determination of rights is served upon each claimant. 
130 (iii) A decree entered in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, 
131 Determination of Water Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any 
132 right determined to be valid in the decree, but [shall] does not bar a claim for periods of nonuse 
133 that occur after the entry of the decree. 
134 (iv) A proposed determination by the state engineer in an action for general 
135 determination of rights under Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, [shall bar any] bars a 
136 claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right proposed to be valid, unless a timely 
137 objection has been filed within the time allowed in Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights. 
138 [(d) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years 
139 unless the time is further extended by the state engineer.] 
140 [(c) The provisions of this section are applicable] 
141 (v) If in a judicial action a court declares a water right forfeited, on the date on which 
142 the water right is forfeited: 
143 (A) the right to use the water reverts to the public; and 
144 (B) the water made available by the forfeiture: 
145 (D first, satisfies other water rights in the hvdrologic system in order of priority date: 
146 and 
147 (H) second, may be appropriated as provided in this title. 
48 (d) This section applies whether the unused or abandoned water or a portion of the 
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149 water isi 
150 (il permitted to run to waste; or [is] 
151 fill used by others without right with the knowledge of the water right holderfr 
152 provided that the use of water pursuant to a lease or other agreement with the appropriator or 
153 the appropriator's successor shall be considered to constitute beneficial use]. 
154 [(f)] fe) [The provisions of this] This section [shall] does not apply to: 
155 (i) the use of water according to a lease or other agreement with the appropriator or the 
156 appropriator's successor in interest; 
157 (ii) a water right if its place of use is contracted under an approved state agreement or 
158 federal conservation fallowing program; 
159 [(i) to] (iii) those periods of time when a surface water or groundwater source fails to 
160 yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right[, or when groundwater is not available because 
161 of a sustained drought]; 
162 (iv) a water right when water is unavailable because of the water right's priority date; 
163 \jitj] (v) [to water stored in reservoirs pursuant to an existing water right, where] a 
164 water right to store water in a surface reservoir or an aquifer, in accordance with Title 73, 
165 Chapter 3b, Groundwater Recharge and Recovery Act, if: 
166 £A} the [stored] water is [being held in storage] stored for present or future use; or 
167 (B) storage is limited by a safety, regulatory, or engineering restraint that the 
168 appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest cannot reasonably correct; 
169 [(iii) when] (vi) a water right if a water user has beneficially used substantially all of [a] 
170 the water right within a [five] seven-year period, provided that this exemption [shall] does not 
171 apply to the adjudication of a water right in a general determination of water rights under 
172 Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights[r]; 
173 (vii) except as provided by Subsection (2)(g), a water right: 
174 (A) (I) owned by a public water supplier; 
175 (ED represented by a public water supplier's ownership interest in a water company; or 
176 (Iff) to which a public water supplier owns the right of use; and 
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177 (B) conserved or held for the reasonable future water requirement of the public, which 
178 is determined according to Subsection (2)(f); 
179 Kg)] Mii} [Groundwater rights used to supplement the quantity or quality of other 
180 water supplies may not be subject to loss or reduction under this section if not used] a 
181 supplemental water right during [periods] a period of time when [the other water source 
182 delivers sufficient water] another water right available to the appropriator or the appropriator's 
183' successor in interest provides sufficient water so as to not require use of the supplemental 
184 [groundwater.] water right; or 
185 (ix) a water right subject to an approved change application where the applicant is 
186 diligently pursuing certification. 
187 (f) (i) The reasonable future water requirement of the public is the amount of water 
188 needed in the next 40 years by the persons within the public water supplier's projected service 
189 area based on projected population growth or other water use demand. 
190 (ii) For purposes of Subsection (2)(f)(i), a community water system's projected service 
191 area: 
192 (A) is the area served by the community water system's distribution facilities; and 
193 (B) expands as the community water system expands the distribution facilities in 
194 accordance with Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water Act. 
195 (g) For a water right acquired by a public water supplier on or after May 5, 2008, 
196 Subsection (2)(e)(vii) applies if: 
197 (i) the public water supplier submits a change application under Section 73-3-3; and 
198 (ii) the state engineer approves the change application. 
199 [(4)] (3) (a) The state engineer shall furnish [an] a nonuse application form requiring the 
>00 following information: 
'01 (i) the name and address of the applicant; 
.02 (ii) a description of the water right or a portion of the water right, including the point of 
03 diversion, place of use, and priority; 
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205 ffiVyi (iii) the quantity of water; 
206 ffrfl (iv) the period of use; 
207 rfrHftl (v) the extension of time applied for; 
208 [fyit)] (vi) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water; and 
209 Kvtii)] (vii) any other information that the state engineer requires. 
210 (b) (]Q Filing the nonuse application extends the time during which nonuse may continue 
211 until the state engineer issues [his] an order on the nonuse application. 
212 (ii) Approval of a nonuse application protects a water right from forfeiture for nonuse 
213 from the application's filing date until the approved application's expiration date. 
214 (c) (i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish a notice of the 
215 application once a week for two successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
216 county in which the source of the water supply is located and where the water is to be used. 
217 (ii) The notice shall: 
2^8 (A) state that an application has been made; and 
219 (B) specify where the interested party may obtain additional information relating to the 
220 application. 
221 (d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the 
222 granting of the application: 
223 (i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is 
224 informal; and 
225 (ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal. 
226 (e) In any proceedings to determine whether the nonuse application [for extension] 
227 should be approved or rejected, the state engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements 
228 of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
229 (f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application. 
230 [{5)] (4) (a) [Nonuse applications] The state engineer shall grant a nonuse application 
231 on all or a portion of a water right [shall be granted by the state engineer for periods] for a 
232 period of time not exceeding [five] seven years [each, upon a showing of] if the applicant shows 
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233 a reasonable cause for nonuse. 
234 (b) [Reasonable causes] A reasonable cause for nonuse [include] includes: 
235 (i) a demonstrable financial hardship or economic depression; 
236 (ii) the initiation of [recognized] water conservation or efficiency practices, or the 
237 operation of a groundwater recharge recovery program approved by the state engineer; 
238 (iii) operation of legal proceedings; 
239 (iv) the holding of a water right or stock in a mutual water company without use by any 
240 [pubKe] water supply entity to meet the reasonable future requirements of the public; 
241 (v) situations where, in the opinion of the state engineer, the nonuse would assist in 
242 implementing an existing, approved water management plan; or 
243 [(vi) situations where all or part of the land on which water is used is contracted under 
244 an approved state agreement or federal conservation fallowing program;] 
245 liyit)] M l the loss of capacity caused by deterioration of the water supply or delivery 
246 equipment if the applicant submits, with the application, a specific plan to resume full use of the 
247 water right by replacing, restoring, or improving the equipment[rorL 
248 [(viii) any other reasonable cause.] 
249 [i€)f] (5) (a) Sixty days before the expiration of [any extension of time] a nonuse 
250 application, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by mail or by any form of electronic 
251 communication through which receipt is verifiable, of the date when the [extension period] 
252 nonuse application will expire. 
153 (b) An applicant may file a subsequent nonuse application in accordance with this 
154 section. 
155 [(b) Defore the date of expiration, the applicant shall cither] 
,56 [(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use 
57 of the water was resumed, and whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; 
58 or] 
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261 [(c) Upon receipt of the applicant's properly completed, verified statement, the state 
262 engineer shall conduct investigations necessary to verify that beneficial use has resumed and, if 
263 so, shall issue a certificate of resumption of use of the water as evidenced by the resumed 
264 beneficial use.] 
265 [(7) The appropriator's water right or a portion of the water right ceases and the water 
26^ reverts to the public if the:] 
267 [(a) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for an 
268 extension of time;] 
269 [(b) state engineer denies the nonuse application; or] 
270 [(c) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for a further 
271 extension of time.] 
272 Section 2. Section 73-2-14 is amended to read: 
273 73-2-14. Fees of state engineer — Deposited as a dedicated credit 
274 (1) The state engineer shall charge fees pursuant to Section 63-38-3.2 for the following: 
275 (a) applications to appropriate water; 
276 (b) applications to temporarily appropriate water; 
277 (c) applications for permanent or temporary change; 
278 (d) applications for exchange; 
279 (e) applications for an extension of time in which to resume use of water; 
280 (f) applications to appropriate water, or make a permanent or temporary change, for 
281 use outside the state filed pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 3a, Water Exports; 
282 (g) gro.undwater recovery permits; 
283 (h) diligence claims for surface or underground water filed pursuant to Section 73-5-13; 
284 (i) republication of notice to water users after amendment of application where required 
285 by this title; 
286 (j) applications to segregate; 
287 (k) requests for an extension of time in which to submit proof of appropriation not to 
288 exceed 14 years after the date of approval of the application; 
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289 (1) requests for an extension of time in which to submit proof of appropriation 14 years 
290 or more after the date of approval of the application; 
291 (m) groundwater recharge permits; 
292 (n) applications for a well driller's license, annual renewal of a well driller's license, and 
293 late annual renewal of a well driller's license; 
294 (o) certification of copies; 
295 (p) preparing copies of documents; and 
296 (q) reports of water right conveyance. 
?97 (2) Fees for the services specified in Subsections (l)(a) through (i) shall be based upon 
298 the rate of flow or volume of water. If it is proposed to appropriate by both direct flow and 
299 storage, the fee shall be based upon either the rate of flow or annual volume of water stored, 
300 whichever fee is greater. 
301 (3) Fees collected under this section: 
302 (a) shall be deposited in the General Fund as a dedicated credit to be used by the 
303 Division of Water Rights; and 
304 (b) may only be used by the Division of Water Rights to: 
305 (i) meet the publication of notice requirements under this title; [and] 
306 (ii) process reports of water right conveyance!?]; and 
307 (iii) hire an employee to assist with processing an application. 
